CAT/OP/PRT/2 follow-up visits should be conducted. The Subcommittee underlines the need always to seek ways to protect those interviewed from possible reprisals, even when there appears to be little risk. The Subcommittee noted, in the visits that were carried out together, that the mechanism did not mention to the authorities of the place of detention at the final debriefings that any form of intimidation or reprisal against persons deprived of their liberty constitutes a violation of the State party’s obligation. 14 40. The Subcommittee recommends that the national preventive mechanism always consider that there is a risk of intimidation, sanctions or reprisals, and therefore take steps to address that risk. In addition to the precautions mentioned above, the mechanism should clearly inform the authorities that reprisal of any kind is impermissible, will be reported to respective authorities and will be followed up by the mechanism. This is done with the clear intention of ensuring that those responsible for such reprisals are promptly investigated, and if found guilty, receive appropriate penalties. The mechanism should also, inter alia, undertake preventive follow-up visits. 41. While noting the high professionalism of many of the NPM members when conducting interviews with the detainees, the Subcommittee recommends that all NPM members undergo regular trainings, including on interviewing techniques, visiting procedures and skills to detect signs and risks of torture and ill treatment, to develop working methods and a comprehensive visiting methodology that will highlight institutional and systematic challenges, including those affecting vulnerable populations in places where persons are deprived of liberty. Experienced NPM members should train the new members and the external experts on interviewing techniques and regular internal meetings to discuss working methods and experiences based on visits should be organized. Visibility and awareness 42. The meetings held by the Subcommittee with some of the relevant authorities revealed, however, that little was known about the national preventive mechanism per se. Clearly, the NPM lacks visibility and there may be a lack of understanding of its role vis-à-vis the Office of the Ombudsperson. The Subcommittee notes that there is limited knowledge of the NPM among relevant stakeholders, including persons deprived of their liberty, public authorities and other State monitoring bodies, civil society actors and the general public. 43. The Subcommittee recommends increasing the visibility of the NPM, including through activities that raise awareness of the OPCAT and of the NPM mandate. The NPM should undertake activities to increase the awareness of the general public, and especially persons deprived of their liberty, about its mission and its mandate. The NPM should engage in legislative processes, advocacy, which NPMs are encouraged to undertake under OPCAT article 19, and which increases their overall visibility. The Subcommittee further recommends the NPM to engage in outreach activities and other events as appropriate. 44. The Subcommittee also recommends elaborating and distributing further materials on the NPM’s mandate and activities to personnel and detainees in the places of deprivation of liberty, and to the civil society at large to increase the visibility of the NPM as well as enhance understanding about its mandate. 45. The Subcommittee further recommends that the NPM engage more directly and independently with civil society organizations, including, at a minimum, through their increased participation in NPM visits, internal trainings, and in dialogue with the authorities. IV. Final recommendations 46. In conclusion, the Subcommittee is aware that the national preventive mechanism of Portugal is facing challenges regarding its institutional and structural 14 Article 13 of the Convention and article 20 of the Optional Protocol. 8