CCPR/C/122/D/2182/2012
6.2
The Committee observes that by adhering to the Optional Protocol, a State party to
the Covenant recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider
communications from individuals claiming to be victims of violations of any of the rights
set forth in the Covenant (preamble and art. 1 of the Optional Protocol). Implicit in a State’s
adherence to the Optional Protocol is an undertaking to cooperate with the Committee in
good faith so as to permit and enable it to consider such communications and, after
examination, to forward its Views to the State party and the individual (art. 5 (1) and (4)). It
is incompatible with these obligations for a State party to take any action that would
prevent or frustrate the Committee in its consideration and examination of the
communication and in the expression of its Views. 5 It is up to the Committee to determine
whether a communication should be registered. By failing to accept the competence of the
Committee to determine whether a communication should be registered and by declaring
beforehand that it will not accept the Committee’s determination on the admissibility or the
merits of the communication, the State party has violated its obligations under article 1 of
the Optional Protocol.6
Consideration of admissibility
7.1
Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must
decide, in accordance with rule 93 of its rules of procedure, whether the communication is
admissible under the Optional Protocol.
7.2
The Committee has ascertained, as required under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional
Protocol, that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of
international investigation or settlement.
7.3
The Committee notes the State party’s assertion that the author has failed to request
that the Chairperson of Minsk City Court, the Chairperson of the Supreme Court or the
Prosecutor General’s Office initiate a supervisory review of the decisions of the domestic
courts. The Committee recalls its jurisprudence according to which a petition to a
Prosecutor’s Office requesting a review of court decisions that have taken effect does not
constitute a remedy that has to be exhausted for the purposes of article 5 (2) (b) of the
Optional Protocol. 7 It also considers that filing requests for supervisory review to the
chairperson of a court directed against court decisions that have entered into force and
depend on the discretionary power of a judge constitutes an extraordinary remedy, and that
the State party must show that there is a reasonable prospect that such requests would
provide an effective remedy in the circumstances of the case. 8 Given that the State party has
not done so, the Committee considers that it is not precluded by article 5 (2) (b) of the
Optional Protocol from examining the present communication.
7.4
The Committee notes the author’s claims that he was detained overnight for seven
hours in a cell with no beds or chairs and only one wooden board that he and another
detainee used for sleeping; that the room temperature in the cell was between 10C and
14C, which resulted in him being constantly cold and having difficulty sleeping; that there
was no separate toilet; and that the food was salty. He alleges that the conditions of his
detention caused him physical and mental suffering and, taken as a whole, amounted to
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, in violation of article 7 of the Covenant. While
emphasizing that certain conditions of detention that subject a detainee to inhuman and
degrading treatment can violate article 7, the Committee refers to paragraph 4 of its general
comment No. 20 (1992) on the prohibition of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment, which reads: “The Covenant does not contain any definition of
5
6
7
8
4
See Levinov v. Belarus (CCPR/C/105/D/1867/2009, 1936, 1975, 1977-1981, 2010/2010), para 8.2;
and Poplavny v. Belarus (CCPR/C/115/D/2019/2010), para. 6.2.
See Korneenko v. Belarus (CCPR/C/105/D/1226/2003), para. 8.2.
See Alekseev v. Russian Federation (CCPR/C/109/D/1873/2009), para. 8.4; Lozenko v. Belarus
(CCPR/C/112/D/1929/2010), para. 6.3; and Sudalenko v. Belarus (CCPR/C/115/D/2016/2010), para.
7.3.
See Gelazauskas v. Lithuania (CCPR/C/77/D/836/1998), para. 7.4; Sekerko v. Belarus
(CCPR/C/109/D/1851/2008), para. 8.3; and Schumilin v. Belarus (CCPR/C/105/D/1784/2008), para.
8.3.