CCPR/C/115/D/2474/2014 asylum claims on the basis of conversion should be assessed with a particular focus on the asylum seeker’s general credibility, and specifically on her or his “personal reflections on the motive for and the consequences of converting”. The Committee also takes note that the Court applied a standard of proof according to which “it is sufficient that the invoked grounds for asylum are seen as being reasonably probable”. The Committee notes the Court’s reasoning finding that several factors weighed against the author’s general credibility, including several alleged contradictory statements for which the author has not provided an explanation.19 The Committee also observes that although the Court considered that the fact that the author was baptized three months after the Board’s final rejection of his initial asylum claim weighed against his credibility, the Court did not automatically discredit the author’s conversion solely on the basis of its timing; rather, the Court noted that genuine religious conversions may be sudden. The Court further considered “the fact that religious conversion can take place in several different ways” and took into account the author’s level of formal education. The Court also stated that there was “no reason to apply a more stringent standard of proof to the asylum statement in conversion cases”, given that the consequences of an incorrect decision would be serious. The Committee considers that the Court did not subject the author’s claim to a higher burden of proof by attaching disproportionate importance to his allegedly inadequate reflection on his reasons for converting. On the basis of the information before it, the Committee therefore cannot conclude that the Court’s decision was arbitrary or amounted to a manifest error or denial of justice. 7.7 The Committee also notes the author’s argument that the State party’s authorities did not have the expertise to assess his religious belief and should have engaged independent experts to do so. The Committee refers to its reasoning in paragraphs 7.4 and 7.5 above and concludes that the author has not established that the State party’s authorities lacked independence in evaluating his claims. 7.8 Finally, the Committee takes note of the author’s claim that the letter issued by the Board on 28 August 2014 indicates that the State party was unwilling to provide him with non-refoulement protection despite having knowledge of facts substantiating his need for such protection. However, the Committee notes that the author has not clarified the basis of this allegation. Furthermore, the Committee also takes note of the State party’s claim that if the author wished to invoke new facts as a ground for protection against non-refoulement, he was able to do so by filing a petition for reversal to the immigration authorities. In the circumstances, the Committee cannot conclude that the information before it shows that the assessment of the organs of the State party was arbitrary or amounted to a manifest error or denial of justice. 7.9 For the foregoing reasons, the Committee cannot conclude that the State party would violate article 7 of the Covenant if it removed the author to Afghanistan. 8. The Human Rights Committee, acting under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is of the view that the author’s removal to Afghanistan would not violate his rights under article 7 of the Covenant. 19 16 See paras. 4.8-4.12 above.