CRPD/C/18/D/28/2015 new and full proceedings for asylum and residence permits, in which their claims would be examined on the merits and could be appealed. The Court therefore found that there was no longer any justification to continue the examination of the applications under article 37 (1) of the European Convention and struck the cases off its list of cases. 10.6 The Committee notes that the author has not contested that the expulsion order of his family has become statute-barred or that the family has the possibility of instituting new proceedings before the migration authorities. The Committee also notes the author’s argument that it is unlikely that the family would be granted residence permits if they were to reapply, given the outcome of the previous domestic proceedings. In that respect, the Committee recalls its jurisprudence, according to which, mere doubts about the effectiveness of a remedy do not absolve a person from seeking to exhaust such a remedy. 15 The Committee recalls the jurisprudence of the Committee against Torture and of the European Court of Human Rights referred to above and notes that there is nothing to indicate that a new application submitted by the author and his family to the State party authorities would not bring effective relief. The Committee also notes that, under rule 71 (2) of its rules of procedure, a decision taken by the Committee declaring a communication inadmissible under article 2 (d) of the Optional Protocol may be reviewed at a later date by the Committee upon receipt of a written request submitted by or on behalf of the individual concerned containing information indicating that the reasons for inadmissibility no longer apply. In the light of the foregoing, the Committee concludes that the author’s claims that deporting his family to Nigeria would constitute a violation by the State party of his son’s rights under articles 7, 12, 15, 24, 25, 26 and 28 of the Convention are inadmissible under article 2 (d) of the Optional Protocol. 10.7 The Committee notes the author’s claim that the State party has violated his son’s right to an adequate standard of living and social protection under article 28 (2) of the Convention by not providing adequate accommodation conditions while the family has been residing in the State party. The Committee also notes that the State party submits that the complaint should be declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. The Committee further notes that no elements in the file enable it to conclude that the author raised this claim during the domestic proceedings. The Committee therefore concludes that this part of the author’s complaint is inadmissible under article 2 (d) of the Optional Protocol. 10.8 In the light of the foregoing, the Committee does not consider it necessary to examine the admissibility of the author’s claim that, in the course of the domestic proceedings, the State party authorities violated his son’s rights under articles 3, 4, 5, 7, 12, 13, 24, 25, 26 and 28 of the Convention. C. Conclusion 11. The Committee therefore decides: (a) Protocol; That the communication is inadmissible under article 2 (d) of the Optional (b) That the decision may be reviewed under rule 71 (2) of its rules of procedure upon receipt of a written request submitted by or on behalf of the victims containing information indicating that the reasons for inadmissibility no longer apply; (c) That the present decision shall be communicated to the State party and to the author. 15 See communication No. 31/2015, D.L. v. Sweden, decision adopted on 24 March 2017, para. 7.3. 13