CRPD/C/18/D/28/2015 should emerge after an expulsion order has become final. It also argues that the cases of the author and his family were thoroughly examined by both the Migration Agency and the migration courts which are specialized bodies with particular expertise in the field of asylum law and practice. The State party further notes that there is nothing to indicate that the author’s son has been discriminated against on grounds of his disability in the course of the proceedings. It also notes that, while residing in Sweden, the author’s son has access to childcare and health care on an equal basis as other children residing in Sweden, including access to special support and care owing to his health status. The State party submits that there is therefore no reason to conclude that the outcome of the domestic proceedings was in any way arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice. The State party also submits that the author’s claims under articles 3, 4, 5, 7, 12, 13, 24, 25, 26 and 28 of the Convention should be declared inadmissible for lack of substantiation. 6.12 The State party notes the author’s claim that the deportation of his son to Nigeria would subject him to inhuman treatment as he will not have access to the same care, support, education and training as he does in Sweden. The State party refers to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in cases concerning the expulsion of persons who are ill, in which the Court has consistently held that contracting States have the right to control the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens. However, in exercising their rights in this respect, contracting States must have regard to article 3 of the European Convention.6 It also notes that the Court has found that the assessment of the minimum level of severity which must be attained in order for ill-treatment to fall within the scope of article 3 of the European Convention is relative and depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment, the manner and method of its execution, its duration, its physical or mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the person concerned.7 The State party refers to the Court’s Grand Chamber judgment in the case of N. v. United Kingdom,8 in which the Court held that the fact that an applicant’s circumstances, including his life expectancy, would be significantly reduced if he were to be removed from the contracting State is not sufficient in itself to give rise to a breach of article 3 of the European Convention. The decision to remove an alien who is suffering from a serious mental or physical illness to a country where the facilities for the treatment of that illness are inferior to those available in the contracting State may raise an issue under article 3, but only in exceptional cases, where the humanitarian grounds against the removal are compelling. The Court also held that aliens who are subject to expulsion cannot, in principle, claim any entitlement to remain in the territory of a contracting State in order to continue to benefit from medical, social or other forms of assistance and services provided by that State. The Court noted that advances in medical science, together with social and economic differences between countries, entail that the level of treatment available in the contracting State and the country of origin may vary considerably and that while it is necessary for the Court to retain a degree of flexibility to prevent expulsion in very exceptional cases, article 3 does not place an obligation on the contracting State to alleviate such disparities through the provision of free and unlimited health care to all aliens without a right to stay within its jurisdiction. 9 In the case of S.H.H. v. United Kingdom, 10 the Court found that the high threshold is applicable even when interpreting article 3 of the European Convention in conjunction with the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The State party considers that a similarly high threshold as that set by article 3 of the European Convention should apply to claims under article 15 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 6 7 8 9 10 See European Court of Human Rights, Bensaid v. the United Kingdom, application No. 44599/98, judgment of 6 February 2001, para. 32. Ibid., Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden, application No. 15576/89, judgment of 20 March 1991. Ibid., N. v. the United Kingdom, application No. 26565/05, judgment of 27 May 2008, para. 29. Ibid., Bensaid v. the United Kingdom; Aoulmi v. France, application No. 50278/99, judgment of 17 January 2006; S.H.H. v. United Kingdom, application No. 60367/10, decision of 29 January 2013; and Senchishak v. Finland, application No. 5049/12, decision of 18 November 2014. See S.H.H. v. United Kingdom. 9