CCPR/C/116/D/2324/2013 constitutes a distinction which is relevant for a non-discrimination analysis, the author has neither submitted that local remedies have been exhausted in this respect nor that there is objectively no prospect of success to challenge the denial of bereavement support and needed post-abortion medical care in domestic proceedings.e Pursuant to article 5 2 (b) Optional Protocol the Committee is therefore prevented from finding a violation of article 26 on this ground. 7. There is another aspect in the Committee’s reasoning which I cannot agree with. The Committee has failed to specify the grounds for the alleged discrimination. In order to support a finding of an article 26 violation a distinction must relate to one of the personal characteristics which are specified in article 26. That the author was adversely affected by the prohibition on abortion in Ireland by virtue of her financial situation is insufficient to ground a claim under article 26. Neither can the State party’s prohibition on abortion be described as a discrimination based on gender. While it is true that it only affects women, the distinction is explained with a biological difference between women and men that objectively excludes men from the applicability of the law and does not amount to discrimination. 8. The author claims that the prohibition is based on a gender-based stereotype which considers women’s “primary role … to be mothers and self-sacrificing caregivers” and stereotypes the author “as a reproductive instrument“(3.19). She also claims that the abortion regime was “reinforcing women’s … inferior social status” (3.20’). But these allegations which are contested by the State party are not supported by any relevant facts. According to the State party the legal framework is the result of a balancing of the right to life of the unborn and the rights of the woman. Though the Committee disagrees in its findings under article 17 with the outcome of the balancing in the case of a fatally-ill foetus, this finding does not warrant the conclusion that the prohibition on abortion is based on gender stereotypes. It is rather grounded on moral views on the nature of life which are held by the Irish population. 9. I appreciate that the Committee does not rely on the allegation of gender stereotypes in its finding under article 26. Instead it refers only to “differential treatment to which the author was subjected in relation to other similarly situated women”. Nevertheless, the Committee has failed to specify on which other status the distinction is grounded. 10. Unless the Committee wants to find a violation of article 26 every time it finds a violation of one of the rights and freedoms protected under the Covenant and deprive this provision of any autonomous meaning and value, the Committee would be well advised to engage with such claims in a more meaningful way giving due account to the notion of discrimination and the prohibited grounds in the future. e The author only submitted that she would not have had any reasonable prospect of success had she petitioned an Irish court for a termination of her pregnancy. 29