CAT/C/39/D/297/2006 page 13 9.3 As to counsel’s claim that the constant threat of being returned to a country where he would be in danger of torture, which hung over the complainant for four years, causing him “serious psychological distress”, in itself constituted a form of torture, the Committee recalls its case law to the effect the aggravation of a complainant’s state of health following expulsion - or, as in this case, by the threat of return while proceedings are ongoing - does not in itself constitute a form of torture or of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of articles 1 and 16 of the Convention.10 9.4 With regard to the State party’s contention that the complaint of a violation of article 3 of the Convention based on the return of the complainant to India is insufficiently substantiated for the purposes of admissibility, the Committee considers that the complainant has provided sufficient evidence to permit it to consider the case on the merits. 9.5 Accordingly, the Committee decides that the complaint is admissible in respect of the alleged violation of article 3 of the Convention based on the return of the complainant to India. The claim relating to non-compliance with the Committee’s request to suspend removal also requires consideration on the merits under articles 3 and 22 of the Convention. Consideration on the merits 10.1 The Committee has considered the present communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, as provided in article 22, paragraph 4, of the Convention. 10.2 The Committee notes the complainant’s contention that the Minister’s delegate, in her decision of 2 December 2003, used irrelevant criteria as grounds for refusing protection, namely that the person constituted a threat to Canada’s security. The Committee recalls that article 3 affords absolute protection to anyone in the territory of a State party, regardless of the person’s character or the danger the person may pose to society.11 The Committee notes that the Minister’s delegate concluded in her decision that the complainant personally ran a real risk of torture if he were returned. However, she considered that the general interest of Canada’s security should prevail over the complainant’s risk of torture, and refused the protection on this basis. 10 See M.B.S.S. v. Canada, communication No. 183/2001, Views of 12 May 2004, para. 10.2; and G.R.B. v. Sweden, communication No. 83/1997, Views of 15 May 1998, para. 6.7. 11 See Tebourski v. France, communication No. 300/2006, Views of 1 May 2007, para. 8.2. Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights has considered the protection from torture to be absolute in the event of removal, as set out in article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, recalling that neither the behaviour of the victim nor the threat they might pose to national security should be taken into account when considering a claim (see decision in Chahal v. United Kingdom).