CAT/C/60/D/648/2015 9.2 The Committee recalls that, in accordance with article 22 (5) (b) of the Convention, the Committee shall not consider any communication unless it has ascertained that the complainant has exhausted all available domestic remedies. The Committee notes that, in the present case, the State party has not contested that the complainant has exhausted all available domestic remedies. The Committee therefore finds that it is not precluded from considering the communication under article 22 (5) (b) of the Convention. 9.3 The Committee also recalls that for a claim to be admissible under article 22 of the Convention and rule 113 (b) of its rules of procedure, it must rise to the basic level of substantiation required for purposes of admissibility. The Committee notes the State party’s argument that the communication is manifestly ill-founded owing to a lack of substantiation. The Committee considers, however, that the arguments put forward by the complainant raise substantive issues under article 3 of the Convention and that the merits of those arguments should be addressed. Accordingly, the Committee declares the communication admissible. Consideration of the merits 10.1 In accordance with article 22 (4) of the Convention, the Committee has considered the communication in the light of all information made available to it by the parties. 10.2 The issue before the Committee is whether the removal of the complainant to Sri Lanka would violate the State party’s obligation under article 3 of the Convention not to expel or to return (refouler) a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture. In assessing this risk, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3 (2) of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. However, the Committee recalls that the aim of such determination is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at a foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would be returned. It follows that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not, as such, constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances. 10.3 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 1 (1997) in the context of article 22 (refoulement and communications), according to which the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. While the risk does not have to meet the test of being highly probable, the Committee notes that the burden of proof generally falls on the complainant, who must present an arguable case that he or she faces a foreseeable, real and personal risk. The Committee further recalls that, in accordance with its general comment No. 1 (1997), it gives considerable weight to findings of fact that are made by organs of the State party concerned, while at the same time it is not bound by such findings and instead has the power, provided by article 22 (4) of the Convention, of free assessment of the facts based upon the full set of circumstances in every case. 10.4 In assessing the risk of torture in the present case, the Committee notes the complainant’s contention that there was a foreseeable, real and personal risk that he would be tortured if returned to Sri Lanka owing to his imputed links to LTTE, born of belonging to a particular social and ethnic group, his alleged detention and torture by police in 2006 after attempting to leave the country, his alleged appearance in court on terrorist charges, his escape from a camp run by pro-Government elements and his unlawful departure from Sri Lanka. The Committee also notes the State party’s observation that its domestic authorities found that the complainant lacked credibility owing to inconsistencies in his factual account of events prior to and since leaving Sri Lanka; that the complainant has not provided credible evidence and has failed to substantiate that there was a foreseeable, real and personal risk that he would be subjected to torture by the authorities if returned to Sri Lanka; that his claims have been reviewed by the competent domestic authorities, in accordance with domestic legislation and taking into account the current human rights 14