not die a natural death and that a number of public figures were aware of the circumstances surrounding the events of 15 October 1987. Blaise Compaoré in the death of Thomas Sankara will be vital in throwing light on the events of 15 October 1987. 8.2 Consequently, the authors first request the Committee to declare admissible the allegation under article 6 of the Covenant, a provision which obliges the State party to investigate and prosecute those responsible for violations of Thomas Sankara’s right to life, and to respect and guarantee Thomas Sankara’s right to life. 27 According to the authors, the State party’s obligation to protect the human dignity of Thomas Sankara continues after his death.28 The failure to comply with the obligation to establish the circumstances of the acknowledged extrajudicial death of an individual is an affront to human dignity. In the light of the evidence that Mr. Sankara did not experience a natural death, notwithstanding his death certificate, but was in fact assassinated during a coup d’état, the authors deem it vital for the State party to protect his dignity by embarking on a judicial investigation and determining the circumstances of his death, and then correcting the death certificate. 8.5 The authors point out that the State party violated article 26 of the Covenant, protecting the right to equality before the law and to freedom from discrimination based on political opinions. Contrary to the State party’s observations, the authors explain that a person may have a political opinion, even if he or she no longer lives in Burkina Faso, and is not involved in politics. The authors consider that the State party has not presented sufficient legal arguments to refute their detailed allegations. Moreover, the State party had noted that the surviving members of the Sankara family had been granted refugee status abroad. The granting of that status, in the authors’ view, constitutes prima facie proof of the existence of discrimination based on political opinions in the country of origin. According to the authors, the State party’s allegations that the Sankara family wished to benefit from special treatment in the Burkina Faso courts demonstrated a failure to understand the nature of the discrimination they had suffered, namely, the deliberate unfair treatment suffered by the authors in their dealings with a variety of official bodies in Burkina Faso. 8.3 Secondly, the authors call on the Committee to declare admissible the allegation under article 16, on the grounds that the State party did not supply a copy of Supreme Court decision No. 46 of 19 June 2001 or did not recognize the authenticity of the copy they themselves submitted. The authors reiterate that the Supreme Court arbitrarily denied Auguste Sankara’s right to be recognized as a person before the law. According to the authors, since the provisions of article 111 of order No. 91-0051/PRES of 26 August 1991 relating to minors are mandatory, it was incumbent on the Supreme Court to note proprio motu the status of Auguste Sankara as a minor, to grant him exemption from the bond requirement and thus to grant him the right of access to the courts. In addition, the authors point out that when the right of a person to be recognized by the law is violated, article 14 of the Covenant is necessarily violated. 8.4 The authors also reiterate their comments relating to violations of articles 7 and 9, paragraph 1, by the State party. They emphasize that the State party’s response to the above-mentioned new elements relating to the role played by President 27 The authors cite communications Nos. 161/1983, Herrera Rubio v. Colombia, Views of 2 November 1987, and 778/1997, Coronel et al. v. Colombia, Views of 24 October 2002. 28 The authors refer to communications Nos. 1024/2001, Sanlés Sanlés v. Spain, decision of 30 March 2004 on inadmissibility, and 717/1996, Acuña Inostroza et al. v. Chile, decision of 23 July 1999 on inadmissibility, and to the individual opinions on communication No. 718/1996, Vargas Vargas v. Chile, decision of 26 July 1999 on inadmissibility. 8.6 In relation to article 14, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, the authors point out that the Supreme Court was guilty of a denial of justice in adopting its decision No. 46 of 19 June 2001, which the State party has still not supplied. The Committee’s jurisprudence confirms that a decision taken by a country’s highest court can in itself be the source of an alleged denial of justice. 29 The authors acknowledge that the Committee has no independent machinery which could conduct an investigation, and is generally not in a position to review the evidence and the facts as assessed by domestic courts. However, the authors refer to the exception to that rule set out in the case Griffin v. Spain.30 In the authors’ view, the Supreme Court displayed a lack of logic when it invoked the failure to pay the modest sum of 5,000 CFA francs in refusing to consider the merits of a case. Supplementary observations by the State party on the authors’ comments 9.1 In its supplementary observations of 15 October 2005, the State party reiterates its observations concerning inadmissibility. According 29 Communication No. 718/1996, Vargas Vargas v. Chile, decision of 26 July 1999 on inadmissibility, para. 6.7. Communication No. 493/1992, Griffin v. Spain, Views of 4 April 1995: “… unless it can be ascertained that the proceedings were manifestly arbitrary, that there were procedural irregularities amounting to a denial of justice, or that the judge manifestly violated his obligation of impartiality” [para. 9.6]. 30 130 130