4.2 Referring to former rule 90 (b) of the Committee’s rules of procedure and the Committee’s past jurisprudence, 7 the State party argues that the communication is inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol because the author has not justified its authority to submit the complaint on behalf of the victim. It distinguishes the decisions invoked by the author from the present case. The two Committee’s decisions and two of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights concern the standing of parents to submit complaints on behalf of their children where they were not recognized as their legal representatives.8 In the present case, such a “special bond” between parent and child does not exist between the author and the victim. In the two remaining decisions of the European Court of Human Rights cited by the author,9 the children were represented by their former counsel. However, counsel had represented the children up to the end of the domestic proceedings. Moreover, counsel’s action on behalf of the children was previously or subsequently approved by the children’s parents or foster parents. In the present case, the author’s power of attorney was revoked before the end of the proceedings, both by the victim’s parents and legal guardian. The author’s communication to the Committee was never approved by the victim’s parents or legal guardian. The author never attempted to obtain such approval. Finally, all decisions invoked by the author involved custody and care procedures, which justified a more extensive interpretation of the criteria for representation, especially since the legal representatives had conflicting interests with the children themselves. January 2003, by which time the initial police investigation was almost completed. The author’s power of attorney was revoked for the last time on 12 August 2003, while the investigation continued for another three months until being finally cancelled on 19 November 2003 when the victim denied the allegations for the second time. Appropriate representation other than by the author was thus available at the domestic level. As to the issue of representation before the Committee, the State party submits that other and more appropriate representation is available to the victim through his parents or “any lawyer or NGO in Serbia or in any other country” who has been duly authorized to act on the victim’s behalf. 4.4 Secondly, for reasons explained above, regarding the nature of the links between the author and the victim, the State party submits that although the author acted as counsel for the victim for seven months (with interruptions), this link is not such as to allow the author to continue representing the victim before the Committee. It adds that the author’s lack of knowledge as to the victim’s present circumstances proves that whatever links may have existed between the author and the child, they no longer exist. Thirdly, the State party notes that while the author claims that the object and scope of the communication is confined to complaints about the domestic criminal investigation not complying with the standards contained in the Covenant, it is actually much broader. 4.5 Finally, on the existence of any conflicts of interest, the State party submits that even though the author may believe that it is acting in the victim’s best interest, the author is not necessarily the best, nor the only authority to do so. It claims that there were no conflict of interest between the child and the Centre for Social Care which was the victim’s legal guardian from 28 January 2003 until his parents’ legal rights were restored. The Centre had in fact acted in the victim’s best interest by revoking the author’s power of attorney because the child’s involvement in the proceedings would disturb his present condition. 4.3 In any case, the State party submits that the criteria developed by the European Court of Human Rights are not fulfilled in the present case.10 Firstly, regarding the question of whether other or more appropriate representation exists or is available, it contends that the author got involved with the case only after having been alerted by a journalist in 7 See, for instance, communication No. 128/1982, U.R. v. Uruguay, Inadmissibility decision of 6 April 1983; communication No. 78/1980, The Mikmaq tribal society v. Canada, Inadmissibility decision of 29 July 1984. 8 See communication No. 417/1990, Balaguer Santacana v. Spain, Views adopted on 15 July 1994, paras. 6.1 and 9.2; communication No. 901/1009, Laing v. Australia, Inadmissibility decision adopted on 9 July 2004, para. 7.3; P., C. and S. v. United Kingdom, application No. 56547/00, Admissibility decision (11 December 2001); and C. and D. v. United Kingdom, application No. 34407/02, Inadmissibility decision (31 August 2004). 9 See S.P., D.P. and A.T. v. United Kingdom, Admissibility decision, application No. 23715/94 (20 May 1996); and S. and others v. United Kingdom, application No.34593/02, Inadmissibility decision (31 August 2004). 10 See S.P., D.P. and A.T. v. United Kingdom, Admissibility decision, application No. 23715/94 (20 May 1996). 4.6 By note verbale of 4 July 2006, the State party reiterated its arguments on the admissibility of the communication and commented on its merits. It recalls that article 14, paragraph 2, of the Covenant provides that everyone charged with a criminal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law; and that the District Court of Pozaverac has found insufficient evidence to continue the criminal investigation against the five alleged perpetrators. It refutes the author’s claim that the treatment of the alleged victim by the competent authorities was discriminatory because of his Roma ethnic origin or social status. 32