party’s jurisdiction;31 that he is personally the victim of violations that have continued since 1962; and that the matter has not been submitted to another procedure of international investigation or settlement. With regard to the Committee’s jurisdiction ratione temporis, counsel considers that the effects of the alleged violations of the rights enshrined in the Covenant are continuing and lasting. While the Committee in principle has no jurisdiction ratione temporis over acts of a State party prior to its ratification of the Optional Protocol, the Committee becomes competent if the acts in question continue to have effects after the entry into force of the Optional Protocol and continue to violate the Covenant or have effects which in themselves constitute a violation of the Covenant.32 This view has also been upheld by the International Law Commission.33 only ratified the Covenant and its Optional Protocol in 1989. Third, as a result, the author and the French citizens exiled from Algeria, as French nationals and for reasons of nationality and culture, naturally turned to their national authorities in France, rather than addressing a foreign State. Fourth, the recourse to French and European proceedings (from 1970 to 2001) explains the time elapsed between 1962 and 2004. Fifth, in August 2001 the French citizens exiled from Algeria were informed that all remedies had been exhausted, 35 which explains the delay between September 2001 and January 2004, when counsel was asked to look into the case and submit it to the Committee. Sixth, on 5 December 2002 the French President proclaimed the adoption of a fourth piece of legislation providing for national contributions in favour of the repatriated French, which raised hopes for a definitive and comprehensive solution. However, bill No. 1499 of 10 March 2004 did not include a reparation mechanism to ensure compensation for confiscated property. Lastly, counsel refers to the Committee’s jurisprudence concerning statutes of limitations in respect of contentious cases: “Further, with regard to time limits, whereas a statute of limitations may be objective and even reasonable in abstracto, the Committee cannot accept such a deadline for submitting restitution claims in the case of the authors, since under the explicit terms of the law they were excluded from the restitution scheme from the outset.”36 For the Committee, the impossibility of exercising remedy is sufficient to declare the proceedings admissible from the standpoint of time. 3.7 With regard to the fact that the author had to wait until 2004 to submit his case to the Committee, counsel notes that article 3 of the Optional Protocol declares inadmissible “any communication … which it considers to be an abuse of the right of submission of such communications”. According to counsel, since the Covenant and the Optional Protocol set no time limits on submission, and that, in keeping with Committee jurisprudence, 34 the author provides explanations to justify the delay, the submission of the communications in 2004 in no way constitutes an abuse of the right of submission. In the first place, the appeals submitted to domestic courts in Algeria since 1962 have been unsuccessful. Second, Algeria 3.8 With respect to the alleged violation of article 1, paragraph 2, of the Covenant, the author claims to be an individual victim of a series of serious infringements of the exercise of a collective right: the right of French citizens exiled from Algeria. It is only because of his belonging to this community that he suffered serious infringement of his individual exercise of collective rights, in particular the inability to dispose freely of his natural wealth and resources, including the right to own property and the right to work. 31 He cites communication No. 409/1990, E.M.E.H. v. France, Views adopted on 2 November 1990, para. 3.2; and communication No. 74/1980, Miguel Angel Estrella v. Uruguay, Views adopted on 29 March 1983. 32 Citing communication No. 24/1977, Sandra Lovelace v. Canada, Views adopted on 30 July 1981, para. 7.3; communication No. 28/1978, Weinberger Weisz v. Uruguay, Views adopted on 29 October 1980, para. 6; communication No. 30/1978, Bleier v. Uruguay, Views adopted on 29 March 1982, para. 7; communication No. 107/1981, Quinteros v. Uruguay, Views adopted on 21 July 1983; communication No. 196/1985, Gueye v. France, Views adopted on 3 April 1989, para. 5.3; and communication No. 586/1994, Adam v. Czech Republic, Views adopted on 23 July 1996. 33 Article 25. 34 He refers to communication No. 787/1997, Gobin v. Mauritius, decision on admissibility adopted on 16 July 2001, relating to a five-year delay (the facts dating from 1991 and the communication being submitted in 1996), in which the Committee ruled that “there are no fixed time limits for submission of communications under the Optional Protocol and that the mere delay in submission does not in itself constitute an abuse of the right of communication. However, in certain circumstances, the Committee expects a reasonable explanation justifying a delay. In the absence of such explanation, the Committee is of the opinion that submitting the communication after such a time lapse should be regarded as an abuse of the right of submission, which renders the communication inadmissible”. 3.9 With regard to the alleged violation of article 12, counsel considers that the conditions of the flight from Algeria are comparable to exile.37 As a result 35 He provides a letter of 20 August 2001 from the former counsel addressed to Mr. Esclapez informing him of the decision of the European Court of Human Rights not to admit the claims in the case of Amsellem and others v. France, which was subsequently transmitted to the 57 applicants on 27 August 2001, and which expresses the view that “these decisions put a definite end to all the proceedings instituted”. 36 Communication No. 857/1999, Blazek v. Czech Republic, Views adopted on 12 July 2001, para. 5.9. 37 He refers to the first draft of article 12, which contained the expression “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary 39