in accordance with rule 93 of its rules of procedure, decide whether or not it is admissible under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The only remaining issue, which might arise under article 17, is whether there are continuing effects by virtue of the State party’s failure to compensate the author for the confiscation of his property. The Committee recalls that the mere fact that the author has still not received compensation since the entry into force of the Optional Protocol does not constitute an affirmation of a prior violation.59 The claims are therefore inadmissible ratione temporis, under article 1 of the Optional Protocol. 8.2 The Committee notes the author’s complaint relating to the status of his family’s property in 1962 and observes that, irrespective of the fact that those events occurred prior to the entry into force of the Optional Protocol for the State party, the right to property is not protected under the Covenant. Any allegation concerning a violation of the author’s right to property per se is thus inadmissible ratione materiae under article 3 of the Optional Protocol.55 9. The Human Rights Committee therefore decides: (a) That the communication is inadmissible under article 1 of the Optional Protocol and article 93, paragraph 3, of the rules of procedure; 8.3 The author claims that the violations of his rights under articles 1, 12, 17 and 27; articles 2, paragraph 1, and 26, separately or in combination; articles 26 and 17 in combination; and article 5 continued after the entry into force of the Optional Protocol for the State party on 12 December 1989. The State party argues that all the author’s claims are inadmissible ratione temporis. The Committee considers that it is precluded from examining violations of the provisions of the Covenant that occurred prior to the entry into force of the Protocol for the State party, unless those violations continued after the entry into force of the Protocol. 56 A continuing violation is to be interpreted as the affirmation, by act or by clear implication, of previous violations by the State party. The measures taken by the State party prior to the entry into force of the Optional Protocol for the State party must continue to produce effects which, in themselves, would constitute a violation of any of the rights established in the articles invoked subsequent to the Protocol’s entry into force.57 In the present case the Committee notes that the State party has adopted certain laws since the entry into force of the Covenant and the Protocol regarding the restitution of certain property to persons of Algerian nationality. However, the author has not shown that these laws apply to him, since they concern only persons “whose land has been nationalized or who have given their land as a gift under Ordinance No. 71-73 of 8 November 1971” (see para. 2.2). 58 (b) That this decision shall be communicated to the State party and to the author, for their information. APPENDIX Individual (concurring) opinion of Committee members Ms. Elisabeth Palm, Sir Nigel Rodley and Mr. Nisuke Ando Although we are in agreement with the majority’s findings in paragraphs 8.2 and 8.3 we are of the opinion that the communication should have been declared inadmissible for abuse of the right of petition and that paragraphs 8.2 and 8.3 should have been replaced by a new paragraph 8.2 drafted as follows: 8.2 The Committee notes the delay of 15 years in this case between the ratification of the Optional Protocol by the State party in 1989 and the submission of the communication in 2004. It observes that there are no explicit time limits for submission of communications under the Optional Protocol. However, in certain circumstances, the Committee is entitled to expect a reasonable explanation justifying such a delay. In the present case, the Committee notes counsel’s various arguments which, in his view, explain why the author was forced to wait until 2004 to submit the communication to the Committee (see para. 3.7). With regard to the argument that the State party only ratified the Covenant and the Optional Protocol in 1989, this does not explain why the author did not begin proceedings in the State party at that stage. The Committee notes counsel’s arguments relating to the proceedings lodged by other persons in France and before the European Court of Human Rights, which were concluded by inadmissibility decisions in 2001 before the European Court. However, nothing indicates that the author himself lodged any such proceedings in France or before the European Court. The Committee also notes that the author received 55 See communication No. 566/1993, I.S. v. Hungary, Views adopted on 23 July 1996, para. 6.1, and communication No. 516/1992, Simunek v. Czech Republic, Views adopted on 19 July 1995, para. 4.3. 56 In accordance with its consistent jurisprudence; see communication No. 516/1992, Simunek v. Czech Republic, Views adopted on 19 July 1995, para. 4.5, and communication No. 310/1988, M.T. v. Spain, decision on admissibility adopted on 11 April 1991, para. 5.2. 57 See communication No. 566/1993, I.S. v. Hungary, Views adopted on 23 July 1996, para. 6.1. 58 See article 3, Ordinance No. 95-26 of 30 Rabi’ al-thani 1416, corresponding to 25 September 1995, amending and supplementing Act No. 90-25 of 18 November 1990 concerning land planning, with reference to Ordinance No. 62-20 of 24 August 1962. 59 See communication No. 520/1992, E. and A.K. v. Hungary, decision on admissibility adopted on 7 April 1994, para. 6.6. 43