Consideration of admissibility 7.2 The Committee has noted the author’s description of the torture to which her sons were subjected to make them confess guilt (paras. 2.2, 2.3 and 2.6 above). She has identified the individuals alleged to have participated in these acts. The material submitted by the author also states that the allegations of torture were brought to the attention of the authorities by the victims themselves, and that they were ignored. In these circumstances, and in the absence of any pertinent explanation from the State party, due weight must be given to her allegations, in particular that the State party authorities did not properly discharge their obligation effectively to investigate complaints about incidents of torture. The Committee considers that the facts as submitted disclose a violation of article 7 in relation of the author’s sons. 6.1 Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Human Rights Committee must, in accordance with rule 93 of its Rules of Procedure, decide whether or not the case is admissible under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant. 6.2 The Committee begins by noting that the author has not provided any proof that she is authorized to act on behalf of her husband, despite the fact that by the time of consideration of the communication by the Committee he should have already served his sentence. Neither has she substantiated why it was impossible for the victim to submit a communication on his own behalf. In the circumstances of the case and in the absence of a power of attorney or other documented proof that the author is authorized to act on his behalf, the Committee must conclude that as far as it relates to her husband, the author has no standing under article 1 of the Optional Protocol.5 7.3 On the claim of a violation of the author’s sons’ rights under article 14, paragraph 3 (g), in that they were forced to sign a confession, the Committee must consider the principles that underlie this guarantee. It refers to its previous jurisprudence that the wording, in article 14, paragraph 3 (g), that no one shall “be compelled to testify against himself or confess guilt”, must be understood in terms of the absence of any direct or indirect physical or psychological coercion by the investigating authorities on the accused with a view to obtaining a confession of guilt.6 The Committee considers that it is implicit in this principle that the burden of proof that the confession was made without duress is on the prosecution. However, the Committee notes that in this case, the burden of proof whether the confession was voluntary was on the accused. The Committee notes that both the Tashkent Regional Court and the Supreme Court ignored the allegations of torture made by the author’s sons. Therefore, the Committee concludes that the State party has violated article 14, paragraphs 2, and 3 (g). 6.3 The Committee has ascertained, as required under article 5, paragraph 2 (a), of the Optional Protocol, that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. Concerning the exhaustion of domestic remedies, the Committee has noted that according to the information submitted by the author, all available domestic remedies have been exhausted. In the absence of any pertinent information from the State party, the Committee considers that the requirements of article 5, paragraph 2 (b), of the Optional Protocol have been met with regard to the author and the author’s sons. 6.4 The Committee considers that there is no impediment to the admissibility of the author’s claims under articles 7; 9 and 17, with regard to herself; articles 6; 7; 9, 14, paragraphs 1, 2, 3 (b), (d), (e) and (g) with regard to the author’s sons, and proceeds to consider it on the merits. 7.4 As to the author’s claim that her sons were denied access to a lawyer of their choosing during the pretrial investigation and the trial, the Committee also notes the author’s contention that she was not informed of the date of her sons’ trial and thus could not hire an independent lawyer to defend them at the trial. Their lawyer, subsequently hired by the author, was twice refused permission to see his clients after they were sentenced to death. The Committee recalls its jurisprudence that, particularly in cases involving capital punishment, it is axiomatic that the accused is effectively assisted by a lawyer at all stages of the Consideration of the merits 7.1 The Human Rights Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, as provided under article 5, paragraph 1, of the Optional Protocol. It notes that, while the State party has commented on the author’s sons’ cases and their conviction, it has not provided any information about the author’s claims with regard to herself and her sons. In the absence of any pertinent information from the State party, due weight must be given to the author’s allegations, to the extent that these have been properly substantiated. 6 Berry v. Jamaica, communication No. 330/1988, Views adopted on 4 July 1994, para. 11.7, Nallaratnam Singarasa v. Sri Lanka, communication No. 1033/2001, Views adopted on 21 July 2004, para. 7.4, and Deolall v. Guyana, communication No. 912/2000, Views adopted on 1 November 2004, para. 5.1. 5 H. v. Italy, communication No. 565/1993, inadmissibility decision of 8 April 1994, para. 4.2. 57