author’s allegations. It points out that it is implicit in the Optional Protocol that States parties make available to the Committee all information at their disposal. In the absence of a reply from the State party, due weight must be given to the author’s allegations, to the extent that these have been properly substantiated.3 down general obligations for States, is accessory in nature and cannot be invoked in isolation by individuals under the Optional Protocol. 5 Consequently, the complaint under article 2 will be analysed together with the author’s other allegations. 5.5 Concerning the allegations relating to articles 6, 7, 17 and 24 of the Covenant, the Committee considers that they are adequately substantiated for purposes of admissibility, and that they appear to raise issues in connection with those provisions. Consequently, it turns to consideration of the substance of the complaint. Issues and proceedings before the Committee Consideration of admissibility 5.1 In accordance with rule 93 of the rules of procedure, before examining the claims made in a communication, the Human Rights Committee must decide whether the communication is admissible under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant. Consideration of the merits 6.1 The Human Rights Committee has considered the present complaint in the light of all the information received, in accordance with article 5, paragraph 1, of the Optional Protocol. 5.2 The Committee notes that, according to the author, the same matter has not been submitted under any other procedure of international investigation. The Committee also takes note of her arguments to the effect that in Peru there is no administrative remedy which would enable a pregnancy to be terminated on therapeutic grounds, nor any judicial remedy functioning with the speed and efficiency required to enable a woman to require the authorities to guarantee her right to a lawful abortion within the limited period, by virtue of the special circumstances obtaining in such cases. The Committee recalls its jurisprudence to the effect that a remedy which had no chance of being successful could not count as such and did not need to be exhausted for the purposes of the Optional Protocol.4 In the absence of a reply from the State party, due weight must be given to the author’s allegations. Consequently, the Committee considers that the requirements of article 5, paragraph 2 (a) and (b), have been met. 6.2 The Committee notes that the author attached a doctor’s statement confirming that her pregnancy exposed her to a life-threatening risk. She also suffered severe psychological consequences exacerbated by her status as a minor, as the psychiatric report of 20 August 2001 confirmed. The Committee notes that the State party has not provided any evidence to challenge the above. It notes that the authorities were aware of the risk to the author’s life, since a gynaecologist and obstetrician in the same hospital had advised her to terminate the pregnancy, with the operation to be carried out in the same hospital. The subsequent refusal of the competent medical authorities to provide the service may have endangered the author’s life. The author states that no effective remedy was available to her to oppose that decision. In the absence of any information from the State party, due weight must be given to the author’s claims. 5.3 The Committee considers that the author’s claims of alleged violations of articles 3 and 26 of the Covenant have not been properly substantiated, since the author has not placed before the Committee any evidence relating to the events which might confirm any type of discrimination under the article in question. Consequently, the part of the complaint referring to articles 3 and 26 is declared inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 6.3 The author also claims that, owing to the refusal of the medical authorities to carry out the therapeutic abortion, she had to endure the distress of seeing her daughter’s marked deformities and knowing that she would die very soon. This was an experience which added further pain and distress to that which she had already borne during the period when she was obliged to continue with the pregnancy. The author attaches a psychiatric certificate dated 20 August 2001, which confirms the state of deep depression into which she fell and the severe consequences this caused, taking her age into account. The Committee notes that this situation could have been foreseen, since a hospital doctor had diagnosed anencephaly in the foetus, yet the hospital director refused termination. The omission on the part of the State in not enabling the author to benefit 5.4 The Committee notes that the author has claimed a violation of article 2 of the Covenant. The Committee recalls its constant jurisprudence to the effect that article 2 of the Covenant, which lays 3 See communication No. 760/1997, J. G. A. Diergaart et al. v. Namibia; Views adopted on 25 July 2000, para. 10.2, and communication No. 1117/2002, Saodat Khomidova v. Tajikistan; Views adopted on 29 July 2004, para. 4. 4 See communication No. 701/1996, Cesáreo Gómez Vázquez v. Spain; Views adopted on 20 July 2000, para. 6.2. 5 See communication No. 802/1998, Andrew Rogerson v. Australia; Views adopted on 3 April 2002, para. 7.9. 111