influential and violent individuals and organizations within the white supremacist movement, both nationally and internationally, who have propagated violent messages of hate and advocated the destruction of Governments and multicultural societies. His status in the white supremacist movement is such that adherents are inspired to actuate his ideology. The State party believes that the author is engaged in the propagation of serious political violence to a degree commensurate with those who execute the acts. On this basis, it contends that the author is indeed a danger to the State party’s national security and a threat to the international community, which justifies his deportation. 4.6 On the author’s claims under article 9, paragraphs 1 and 3, relating to his detention, the State party submits that the author has initiated domestic legal proceeding based on the Charter, alleging essentially the same complaints that he raises under article 9 in the present communication. The author’s constitutional action before the Federal Court of Canada alleges that the national security certificate process as applied to the author violates sections 7, 9 and 10 (c) of the Charter. As in this communication, the author alleges Charter violations based on the non-disclosure of all of the evidence against him, the duration of his detention, and the promptness and fairness of the hearing. In light of available domestic remedies, which are actually being pursued by the author, the State party submits that this portion of the communication is inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies. 4.3 The State party points out that the hearing of evidence into the reasonableness of the security certificate and the need for ongoing detention occurred on various dates in 2003 and 2004. In 2003 in particular, the hearing was prolonged due to the repeated unavailability of author’s counsel. The hearing was also interrupted several times by the author’s last minute motions, including to have the presiding judge recuse himself for alleged bias, which all failed. 4.7 On the author’s claim under article 9, paragraph 1, relating to alleged violations arising from incidents dating from 1984 to 1995, the State party contends that the author has failed to demonstrate that he ever attempted to pursue domestic remedies that would have been available to redress any proven misconduct by law enforcement officials and/or Crown prosecutors. Various judicial remedies were and are potentially available to the author, including judicial review for mala fides, bias, flagrant impropriety, abuse of power, etc., and actions based on the Charter. Additionally, administrative complaint procedures could have provided effective remedies, but the author has not apparently pursued such remedies either. The author makes no claim to have pursued such remedies in relation to the law enforcement agencies that he seeks to impugn. Still in relation to the claim under article 9, paragraph 1, the State party adds that the author did not act diligently in presenting his claims that it failed to protect his security by not investigating and prosecuting alleged attacks made against him and his property between 1984 and 1995. For the State party, a delay of ten to twenty years without reasonable justification renders this claim inadmissible as an abuse of the right of submission.8 4.4 On admissibility, the State party submits that the author has failed to show that the availability of any domestic remedies would be unreasonably prolonged. The State party refers to the Committee’s jurisprudence that seeking redress for alleged violations of rights and freedoms, like those guaranteed under the Charter and other public law remedies, via the normal judicial process would not be unreasonably prolonged within the meaning of article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol.6 It further submits that the author has failed to exhaust available remedies and that he has implicitly admitted that he has not done so. 4.5 On the claims under article 7 and 10, the State party indicates that the Charter guarantees that conditions of detention respect the dignity of detainees. The author could have challenged his conditions of detention under any of Sections 2, 7, 8, 10 and 12 of the Charter. In addition, other more particular legal rules governed the author’s detention, the enforcement of which by a domestic court through judicial review could have provided a remedy to the type of complaints made by the author.7 4.8 On the author’s claims under article 14, paragraphs 1 to 3, the State party indicates that the author has initiated domestic proceedings before the Federal Court of Canada alleging essentially the same complaints that he raises in this 6 The State party refers to communication No. 67/1980, E.H.P. v. Canada, decision of 27 October 1982, para. 8; communication No. 358/1989, R.L. et al. v. Canada, decision of 5 November 1991, para. 6.4; communication No.228/1987, C.L.D. v. France, decision of 18 July 1988, para. 5.3; and communication No. 296/1988, J.R.C. v. Costa Rica, decision of 30 March 1989, para. 8.3. 7 See sections 28 and 33-34 of the Ministry of Correctional Services Act, R.R.O. 1990 Reg. 778, which provides an avenue for inmates held in Ontario facilities, as was the author, to complain about their treatment. 8 See communication No. 787/1997, Gobin v. Mauritius, Views adopted on 16 July 2001, para. 6.3. 24