decided that “the confiscations themselves are not here at issue, but rather the denial of a remedy to the authors, whereas other claimants have recovered their properties or received compensation therefor”, 49 and that “legislation must not discriminate among the victims of the prior confiscations, since all victims are entitled to redress without arbitrary distinctions”.50 There was therefore a violation of articles 2, paragraph 1, and 26 of the Covenant, separately or in combination, and of articles 26 and 17 in combination. adoption of the Covenant (December 1966) and its entry into force (March 1976). Furthermore, the State party became a party to the Covenant only when it ratified it on 12 December 1989. Moreover, according to the rules of procedure, referral to the Committee is only permissible once domestic remedies have been exhausted. This appears not to have been the case for the author who, as a French national, should first address the competent authorities in his own country. Additional comments by the parties 3.14 The claimed violation of article 5 of the Covenant stems from the destruction of the author’s rights and freedoms in 1962. According to counsel, the scope of article 5, paragraph 2, also enables him to raise the question of implementation of article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Taking into account the above-mentioned claimed violations, article 5 was also violated. 5.1 In a letter dated 10 January 2006, counsel refers to his previous explanations for the delay in submission of the communication. Owing to the institution of compensatory measures in France, the author believed that the State party was not legally liable for the confiscation. The principle according to which certain factual situations suspend limitation for an action for compensation is recognized in international law. As for the State party’s argument regarding the “specific period in Algerian history”, counsel fails to understand how this reference to history demonstrates the inadmissibility of the communication and asks the State party to explain its remark so that he can respond. The State party does not challenge his repeated affirmation of the continuing effect of the claimed violations52 after the entry into force of the Covenant owing to the fact that the State party, contrary to the Evian agreements and domestic law, has not established the Court of Guarantees. 3.15 As for the mental pain and anguish suffered by the author, counsel maintains that the author’s relocation entailed very serious moral damage based on continuing mental suffering and emotional anguish, together constituting a “confiscation” trauma. This calls for an official recognition by the State party of its responsibility in violating the author’s fundamental rights. Counsel expressly requests the Committee to note that the State party, which is in breach of its obligations under the Covenant and under its domestic legislation, is obliged to remedy this series of violations. In the author’s opinion, satisfaction in this case would constitute an appropriate way of compensating the moral damage. There would be a degree of satisfaction in achieving recognition of the fact that there are good grounds for the communication. He does not, however, lose sight of the need for reparation in the form of just and equitable financial compensation 51 for his confiscated property in Algeria. 5.2 Regarding exhaustion of domestic remedies, the author reiterates that adequate and effective domestic remedies have never been available to him in Algeria. He recalls the position of the Algerian authorities—which is well known and has been vehemently asserted since the dispossession—which is either to eliminate the legal remedies or not to see them through so that the violations come to an end. The author is not obliged to pursue remedies, given that no French person from Algeria has obtained satisfaction for dispossession.53 In its reply, the State party provides no solution or conclusion to the technical and legal questions raised by the author. As for the State party’s argument that the author should seek redress in his own country (France) regarding a dispute over Algerian Government measures, counsel questions why the author should be obliged to involve France. Counsel refers to his exchange of correspondence with various French authorities in 2005, indicating that the highest French public State party’s observations 4. In its observations of 17 October 2005, the State party argues that the communication should be declared inadmissible. The facts cited relate to a specific period in Algerian history and pre-date the international law”. Counsel also refers to article 2 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States adopted on 12 December 1974 (General Assembly resolution 3281 (XXIX)). 49 Communication No. 516/1992, Simunek v. Czech Republic, Views adopted on 19 July 1995, para. 11.4. 50 Para. 11.6. See also communication No. 586/1994, Adam v. Czech Republic, Views adopted on 23 July 1996; and communication No. 857/1999, Blazek v. Czech Republic, Views adopted on 12 July 2001, para. 5.8. 51 See communication No. 747/1997, Des Fours v. Czech Republic, Views adopted on 30 October 2001, para. 9.2. 52 Referring to communication No. 196/1985, Gueye v. France, Views adopted on 3 April 1989; communication No. 586/1994, Adam v. Czech Republic, Views adopted on 23 July 1996 (para. 6.3); and communication No. 6/1977, Sequeira v. Uruguay, Views adopted on 29 July 1980. 53 Communication No. 4/1977, William Torres Ramírez v. Uruguay, Views adopted on 23 July 1980, para. 9. 41