particular by being required to attend the Work for Dole programme. If she refused to participate, she would be impoverished by a reduction or suspension of her unemployment benefits. that it concerned direct operation of social security law, rather than any exercise of discretion by a decision maker. Alternatively, the State party argues that the author could have applied to Federal Court directly for judicial review of the decision to refer her to a Work for Dole programme. 3.2 The author further claims that she is without a remedy for her complaint, in violation of article 2, paragraphs 2 and 3 (a), (b) and (c), of the Covenant, as her complaint to HREOC was not accepted for consideration. In particular, she argues that HREOC had the authority to make reports or recommendations to the Attorney-General which could have been utilized in this case. 4.5 Turning to the subsidiary claim under article 2, the State party argues that the claim under article 2 is incompatible with the Covenant and further inapplicable to the facts pleaded. The State party refers to the Committee’s jurisprudence that article 2 is of accessory nature to the substantive articles of the Covenant, and thus, in the absence of a violation of article 8 of the Covenant, a separate article 2 issue cannot arise. In addition, the communication contains no claims that are capable of amounting to a breach of article 2, nor does the communication set out the nature of the alleged violation claimed. The State party’s submissions on admissibility and merits 4.1 By submissions of 17 June 2002, the State party challenges both the admissibility and merits of the communication. The State party details the operation of its WFD programme, imposing on persons such as the author the obligation to perform certain community labour, upon pain of reduction of unemployment benefits. The scheme is described in greater detail in Annex to the communication. 4.6 The State party adds that this claim is inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies on the basis of the arguments set out in this respect in relation to article 8, supra. Finally, it contends this claim is unsubstantiated, for purposes of admissibility: it is a mere assertion, with no evidence submitted to suggest that the author has been denied an effective remedy. 4.2 As to the admissibility of the communication, the State party argues that the principal claim under article 8 is inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies, as the author’s participation in the Work for Dole programme could have been challenged under an extensive domestic social security review and appeals system established by law. Administrative review is available for any decision made in relation to social security entitlement—thus, a decision to include participation in a Work for Dole programme in a person’s ‘Preparing for Work’ Agreement is subject to review, as is a decision that a person participate in a Work for Dole programme as part of the general activity test. This objective review is carried out by specialist officer, not being the original decision maker. Thereafter, review is available in the Social Security Appeals Tribunal and appeal to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. Further appeal to the federal courts and the High Court of Australia then is available. 4.7 On the merits of the article 8 claim, the State party points out that in the absence of substantive consideration of the issue of forced labour by the Committee, the Committee should be guided by the approaches of other international organizations. 3 While reference to the ILO conventions on forced labour (No. 29 of 1930) and on the abolition of forced labour (No. 105 of 1957) was deliberately omitted from the Covenant because of difficulties with the ILO definitions, it is suggested that conclusions of the ILO’s Committee of Experts can still be drawn on for assistance in determining the “permissible” forced or compulsory labour that can be imposed. An academic commentator argues that States must meet certain minimum labour and social welfare law standards contained in the two ILO conventions in order to come within the exceptions set out in article 8, paragraph 3, of the Covenant.4 4.3 In the present case, the author only sought an internal administrative review on 10 December 2001, not availing herself of the further appeals available. The communication was submitted well prior to that date, despite the author having been notified on numerous occasions as to her appeal rights. She can thus be taken to have been reasonably aware of her review rights, and any doubts she may have about their effectiveness cannot absolve her of her obligation to pursue them. 3 The State party refers to but two occasions where the issue was even touched on: Timmerman v. The Netherlands, communication No. 871/1999, decision adopted on 29 October 1999, and Wolf v. Panama communication No. 289/1988, Views adopted on 26 March 1992. [Note to the Committee: In the first case, the Committee declared inadmissible a claim that engaging in certain professional employment on a disputed pay scale amounted to forced labour, while in the second, the Committee found unsubstantiated a claim that a remind prisoner had to perform forced labour while in pretrial custody.] 4 Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (N.P. Engel, Kehl am Rhein, 1993), p. 157. 4.4 The author also did not apply for judicial review of HREOC’s decision that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain her complaint on the basis 69