the present applicability of the Van der Mussele reasoning of the European Court, on the basis that she was not in an apprentice-teacher relationship or training for a specific vocation compulsory labour. In any event this precedent is inapplicable as she was never offered, and thus could not have refused, suitable work, as said to be required by the ILO instruments. Rather, she was enrolled into the Work for Dole programme, and subsequently had her unemployment benefits suspended, in the absence of a prior offer of suitable work. She emphasizes that she was enrolled into the Work for Dole programme for purposes of doing community work. She rejects the European Commission’s reasoning in the X case that suspension of unemployment benefits cannot be taken as amounting to payments later suspended without having being offered such work. legislation in question, in this case the 1997 Act and the requirement of participation in the Work for Dole programme imposed pursuant to it, does in fact apply to her, when what is being challenged before the Committee is the substantive operation of that law, the content of which is not open to challenge before the domestic courts.9 As the State party has not shown how the substantive content of the Work for Dole regime set out in the 1997 Act that is applicable to her can be challenged in the domestic courts, the Committee considers that it is not precluded by article 5, paragraph 2 (b), of the Optional Protocol from consideration of the case. 6.3 As to the argument that the claims under articles 2 and 8 fall ratione materiae outside the scope of the Covenant and are insufficiently substantiated, the Committee considers that the author has advanced arguments of a sufficient weight to substantiate, for purposes of admissibility, her claims under these articles of the Covenant. 5.2 The author argues that the threat, real or perceived, of an entire suspension of unemployment benefits in the event of her failure to participate in the Work for Dole programme must be taken as imposing a high degree of mental constraint, contending that “the prospective scenario of starvation cannot be reasonably construed otherwise”. Consideration of the merits 7.1 The Human Rights Committee has considered the present communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, as provided in article 5, paragraph 1 of the Optional Protocol. 5.3 The author rejects the contention that domestic remedies were not exhausted, arguing that HREOC and certain Work for Dole administrative correspondence did not explicitly advise a right of review. In any event, the threat of cancellation of unemployment benefits described in the latter conveyed the impression that no right of review was available. The author cites the Committee’s decision in Landry v. Canada8 as support for the proposition that in such circumstances the State party is stopped from advancing a claim that domestic remedies have not been exhausted. 7.2 Turning first to the claim under article 2 of the Covenant, the Committee recalls that article 2 requires a State party to provide an effective remedy for breaches of Covenant rights. In its decision in the case of Kazantzis v. Cyprus,10 the Committee stated that “article 2, paragraph 3, requires that in addition to effective protection of Covenant rights States parties must ensure that individuals also have accessible, effective and enforceable remedies to vindicate those rights …. A literal reading of this provision seems to require that an actual breach of one of the guarantees of the Covenant be formally established as a necessary prerequisite to obtain remedies such as reparation or rehabilitation. However, article 2, paragraph 3 (b), obliges States parties to ensure determination of the right to such remedy by a competent judicial, administrative or legislative authority, a guarantee which would be void if it were not available where a violation had not yet been established. While a State party cannot be reasonably required, on the basis of article 2, paragraph 3 (b), to make such procedures available Issues and proceedings before the Committee Consideration of admissibility 6.1 Before considering any claims contained in a communication, the Human Rights Committee must, in accordance with article 93 of its rules of procedure, decide whether or not it is admissible under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant. 6.2 On the issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies, the Committee observes that there is no dispute that the author comes squarely within the scope of the impugned legislation, with the alleged violation deriving from the direct application of the law to her. As the Committee observed in a similar context, it would be futile to expect an author to bring judicial proceedings which would merely confirm the undisputed fact that the primary 9 See the Committee’s rejection of the same argument with respect to mandatory detention provisions of the Migration Act in A. v. Australia, case No. 560/1993, Views adopted on 4 March 1997, C v. Australia, case No. 900/1999, Views adopted on 28 October 2002, Baban et al. v. Australia, communication No. 1014/2001, Views adopted on 6 August 2003, and Bakhtiyari v. Australia, case No. 1069/2002, Views adopted on 29 October 2003. 10 Case No. 972/2001, decision adopted on 7 August 2003, para. 6.6. 8 Communication No. 112/1981, decision adopted on 8 April 1986. 72