CAT/C/57/D/605/2014 8.2 The Committee recalls that, in accordance with article 22 (5) (b) of the Convention, it is precluded from considering any complaint unless it has ascertained that all available domestic remedies have been exhausted. The Committee notes that, in the present case, the State party has not challenged the admissibility of the complaint on this ground. 8.3 As regards the other arguments by the State party that the complaint should be declared inadmissible, the Committee considers that these arguments are closely related to the merits of the case, and therefore declares the complaint admissible insofar as it raises issues under article 3 of the Convention. As the Committee finds no further obstacles to admissibility, it declares the present complaint admissible and proceeds to its consideration of the merits. Consideration of the merits 9.1 The Committee has considered the complaint in the light of all information made available to it by the parties, in accordance with article 22 (4) of the Convention. 9.2 In the present case, the issue before the Committee is whether the return of the complainant to Sri Lanka would constitute a violation of the State party’s obligation under article 3 of the Convention not to expel or to return (“refouler”) a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 9.3 The Committee must evaluate whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainant would be personally in danger of being subjected to torture upon returning to Sri Lanka. In assessing that risk, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3 (2) of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. However, the Committee recalls that the aim of such determination is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at a foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would be returned. It follows that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances. 23 9.4 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 1 (1997) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22, according to which the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. Although the risk does not have to meet the test of being highly probable (para. 6), the Committee recalls that the burden of proof generally falls upon the complainant, who must present an arguable case that he or she faces a foreseeable, real and personal risk. 24 The Committee gives considerable weight to findings of fact that are made by organs of the State party concerned, 23 24 12 See, for example, communications No. 467/2011, Y.B.F., S.A.Q. and Y.Y. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 31 May 2013, para. 7.2; No. 392/2009, R.S.M. v. Canada, decision adopted on 24 May 2013, para. 7.3; and No. 213/2002, E.J.V.M. v. Sweden, decision adopted on 14 November 2003, para. 8.3. See, for example, communications No. 203/2002, A.R. v. Netherlands, Views adopted on 14 November 2003, para. 7.3; No. 285/2006, A.A. et al. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 10 November 2008, para. 7.6; No. 322/2007, Njamba and Balikosa v. Sweden, decision adopted on 14 May 2010, para. 9.4; No. 343/2008, Arthur Kasombola Kalonzo v. Canada, decision adopted on 18 May 2012, para. 9.3; and No. 414/2010, N.T.W. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 16 May 2012, para. 7.3. GE.16-09596