A/HRC/4/40/Add.4 page 16 V. ISSUES OF CONCERN A. Abdication of the responsibility to monitor legality of detention 1. The responsibility of the juez de ejecución 61. In visiting detention centres, speaking to detainees and revising case files of detainees, the Working Group has found a number of cases in which the maximum length of detention on remand as dictated in the new criminal procedure code appears to have been exceeded. The police in charge of the detention centres take the stance that they cannot release anyone without an order from a judge, even if that means keeping a person in detention without legal basis. Detainees who have accrued the right to benefits such as conditional release often remain in detention, because they have no means to exercise that right in practice, as they do not have a lawyer or family member who would raise the matter with the juez de ejecución, and no opportunity to speak with the judge or transmit a message to him or her. 62. The CPP clearly establishes the responsibility of the juez de ejecución to ensure that preventive detention and prison sentences are carried out in accordance with the law and judicial decisions. The juez de ejecución is further mandated to keep record of the serving of prison terms, to determine at what time a convict can apply for conditional release, and to keep both the detainee and the prison authorities informed on these matters. 63. The reality in Honduras’ prisons, however, is that where there should be control of the legality of detention there is instead a gaping void. This situation is in part explained by the insufficient number of jueces de ejecución. According to the Supreme Court there should be 24 jueces de ejecución, but there are currently only 12. In Tegucigalpa, two jueces de ejecución are responsible for monitoring the legality of the detention of more than 3,000 persons deprived of liberty. Considering the absence of a proper prison administration and of internal procedures for the resolution of issues arising in the penitentiary context (disciplinary measures, benefits, release), as well as the omnipresent corruption, which the Working Group all describes below, a ratio of one judge per 1,000 prisoners (or 1,500 in Tegucigalpa) is not sufficient. 64. However, it is the Working Group’s impression that the insufficient number of jueces de ejecución only partially explains the almost complete absence of control over the legality of detention. Many of the jueces de ejecución, and the same applies for public prosecutors and public defence lawyers, appear to have to a great extent abdicated their mandate to exercise this control. 65. The jueces de ejecución are also to receive complaints of detainees concerning disciplinary measures and to rule on them. In practice, in violation of article 381 CPP, the jueces de ejecución do not exercise any ex officio control over the imposition of disciplinary measures, which are imposed at the whim of the prison police. The Working Group was particularly troubled by the situation it encountered in the high security wing of the Penitenciaría Nacional, the main prison in Tegucigalpa, the so-called “Escorpión”. The detainees there are held in small isolation cells and do not get any exercise or other opportunity to leave their cells. The Working Group was not able to determine the criteria and rules by which the detainees are sanctioned to