CCPR/C/115/D/2005/2010 the United States may prosecute the author again for the same conduct, in violation of his right to be protected against double jeopardy under article 14 (7) of the Covenant. 42. The right not to be compelled to testify against oneself or to confess guilt in article 14 (3) (g) of the Covenant necessarily prohibits guilty pleas, such as this, that are tainted by compulsion. The guilty plea was unlawful for the following reasons: (a) the underlying offence on which it was based was retroactive; (b) a plea agreement cannot be “voluntary” where, but for the plea, the person faces a manifestly unfair criminal trial; and (c) the plea agreement was based on unlawful psychological coercion, pressure and duress. The only real alternative was to plead guilty. Otherwise, his options were either to proceed to an unfair trial or to remain in detention pending further United States litigation challenging the military commissions, which would likely have involved more years without trial at Guantanamo Bay. Accepting the agreement provided him with the only real prospect of release within a reasonable time. 43. Australia was not a direct party to the plea agreement, which is an instrument of United States criminal law. Nonetheless, Australia can be held responsible for the breaches of the author’s right arising from it for the following reasons. 44. In article 11 of the draft articles on State responsibility adopted by the International Law Commission in 2001, it is stipulated that conduct which is not attributable to a State shall nevertheless be considered an act of that State under international law if and to the extent that the State acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question as its own. Australia clearly and unequivocally acknowledged and adopted as its own the original conduct of the United States in accepting and upholding the agreement for the following reasons: (a) The author’s conviction was based wholly on the United States Military Commission’s acceptance of the agreement, which operated to waive a full criminal trial. In accepting the plea, the Military Commission conducted no independent inquiry into its truthfulness or reliability, into whether the sources of evidence upon which it was based were properly obtained or into whether the prosecution’s case would support a conviction; (b) The agreement was the indispensable element of the conviction and sentence. Hence, any enforcement of the sentence of imprisonment necessarily constituted an acknowledgment and adoption of the agreement by Australia as the State enforcing the sentence; (c) The United States suspended its enforcement of the author’s sentence in favour of the assumption by Australia of full responsibility for the enforcement. Accordingly, the conduct of Australia goes beyond mere support or approval of the military commission process and instead constitutes an acknowledgement and adoption of the United States conviction and agreement; (d) Australia was aware of the circumstances of the agreement, not only from its consular attention to the matter, but also under the terms of the transfer arrangement, which required the United States to provide Australia with detailed documentation on the case, including a certified copy of all judgements, sentences and determinations; (e) The Australian authorities did not independently assess the evidence upon which the United States authorities relied in framing the stipulation of facts in the plea agreement; (f) Australian authorities invoked the agreement in their dealings with the author in Australia. For instance, the Australian Federal Police threatened him that his suspended sentence would be revived if he refused to cooperate with Australian law enforcement authorities as required under the agreement. 21