CCPR/C/115/D/2005/2010 with them at other times and in other places (including in Australia and the United States). Furthermore, the United States authorities searched, copied and/or seized confidential legal documents from him on numerous occasions and all materials brought into Guantanamo Bay by lawyers were monitored and filtered. Video cameras were present in the rooms where the author met with his lawyers. 20. The author’s military counsel was subjected to pressure by the prosecution for having publicly criticized the military commissions. As for his Australian foreign civilian lawyers, they were required to sign undertakings in relation to the trial. For instance, they were required not to publicly comment to the media or any person about the trial without the permission of the military commissions. Claims under article 14 (3) (c) regarding the right to be tried without undue delay 21. Delays in the author’s trial were mainly linked to delays in providing a competent tribunal to determine the status of detainees held at Guantanamo Bay; the fact that the Military Commissions Act system had to be reviewed in 2006 after the Supreme Court of the United States, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld et al., determined that the 2001 system did not satisfy the minimum requirements of a procedurally fair trial; and the limitations on the author’s access to full and expeditious legal advice and representation. Claims under article 14 (3) (d) regarding the right of author to be tried in his presence or to defend himself through counsel of his own choosing 22. The author did not enjoy his rights under this provision. An accused could be excluded from any hearing to determine whether to protect against the disclosure of classified information under § 949d (f). This procedure impaired the author’s ability to know and test the evidence against him. He would not have been able to attend, participate in or even be aware of the existence of such proceedings had he proceeded to trial. An accused could be excluded from any portion of the proceedings if the judge determined that the exclusion was necessary to ensure the physical safety of individuals or to prevent the accused from disrupting the proceedings. Claims under article 14 (3) (e) regarding the right of author to examine or have examined witnesses 23. Under rule 703 (a) of the Rules for Military Commissions, the defence was only entitled to a “reasonable opportunity” to obtain witnesses and other evidence. The prosecution was entitled to rely on statements from witnesses who were released from Guantanamo Bay, in circumstances where the author could not have secured their repatriation to Guantanamo Bay to cross-examine them. Other witnesses may have been unavailable because of the long delay in bringing the author to trial. A defendant was in general not entitled to the presence of a witness who was deemed “unavailable” at the discretion of the military judge. 24. The Military Commissions Act, § 949a (b), expressly permits the admission of hearsay evidence, as long as the other party is notified in advance and provided with particulars. A reverse onus is then placed on the accused to demonstrate that the admission of the evidence would be unreliable or lacking in probative value. There is thus no onus on the party adducing the evidence to demonstrate why reliance on hearsay evidence is necessary or not unduly prejudicial. 25. An accused may not become aware of the fact that evidence has been obtained by torture or coercion since the interrogation techniques used to obtain evidence subsequently presented at trial may themselves be classified and thereby outside the knowledge of the accused. The failure to exclude hearsay or coerced evidence and the inability of the accused 17