CCPR/C/115/D/2005/2010 impartiality. The author had the opportunity to give evidence challenging that interpretation, but did not use it. Author’s comments 133. In connection with the standard of proof, the author submits that the standard requiring only “reasonable satisfaction” still permits a very wide margin for error and falls well short of the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt. A standard closer to the criminal standard is more acceptable in control order proceedings than relying on a civil standard. He also reiterates his claim that the court should not have exercised its discretion to impose a control order as it was not necessary in the circumstances. It cannot be necessary to impose rights restrictions solely in respect of past conduct that was not unlawful, to prevent potential future conduct that is also not harmful to civilians and cannot genuinely be classified as “terrorist”. 134. Regarding the letters to his family, the author reiterates that the court did not closely examine the range of possible meanings that they conveyed and assumed the worst of the author, without demonstrating how they revealed an intention to unlawfully harm civilians. 135. As to his ability to challenge the evidence, the author submits that the court should have asked harder questions in scrutinizing the evidence and satisfied itself as to the facts that the evidence was actually capable of supporting. There was no credible evidentiary basis for the court to find that the author intended to harm civilians currently or in future. That was true even in the absence of the author’s own evidence to rebut the Australian authorities’ case. 136. The legislation does not formally require the authorities or courts to consider other, less invasive means before applying for or issuing a control order. In his case, the court considered the availability of surveillance in determining adjustments to the restrictive measures. The court did not, however, carefully scrutinize the means of surveillance, illustrating the point that the court did not adequately examine whether other means were able to secure the same security end with less invasive effects. Control orders were abolished in the United Kingdom because of concerns about their effectiveness, necessity and adverse impacts on human rights. 137. Regarding the definition of terrorism, the author reiterates that it is too vague and had an adverse effect in his case by leading directly to the imposition of the control order. 138. The author also contends that the ne bis in idem principle is not limited to cases where two criminal proceedings are involved, but may encompass, for instance, a criminal proceeding followed by a civil process that imposes punishment or penalties in respect of the same underlying conduct. 39