reintroduction within the State's jurisdiction, and to an indirect one, as it is the case when the State's jurisdiction, and to an indirect one, as it is the case when the State acts – through extradition, expulsion or compulsory return – in such a way that an individual within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction may be exposed to capital punishment in another State. I therefore conclude that in the present case there has been a violation of article 6 of the Covenant. reserved by the Covenant – and that in an express and unambiguous way – for non-abolitionist States. The second error consists in regarding as an authorization to re-establish the death penalty in a country which has abolished it what is merely an implicit recognition of its existence. This is an extensive interpretation which runs counter to the proviso in paragraph 6 of article 6 that "nothing in this article shall be invoked ... to prevent the abolition of capital punishment". This extensive interpretation, which is restrictive of rights, also runs counter to the provision in article 5, paragraph 2, of the Covenant that "there shall be no restriction upon or derogation from any of the fundamental human rights recognized or existing in any State party to the present Covenant pursuant to law, conventions, regulations or custom on the pretext that the present Covenant does not recognize such rights or that it recognizes them to a lesser extent". Taken together, these texts prohibit a State from engaging in distributive application of the death penalty. There is nothing in the Covenant to force a State to abolish the death penalty but, if it has chosen to do so, the Covenant forbids it to reestablish it in an arbitrary way, even indirectly. F. Pocar E. INDIVIDUAL OPINION SUBMITTED BY MRS. CHRISTINE CHANET (DISSENTING) The questions posed to the Human Rights Committee by Mr. Kindler's communication are clearly set forth in paragraph 14.1 of the Committee's decision. Paragraph 14.2 does not require any particular comment on my part. On the other hand, when replying to the questions thus identified in paragraph 14.1, the Committee, in order to conclude in favour of a non-violation by Canada of its obligations under article 6 of the Covenant, was forced to undertake a joint analysis of paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 6 of the Covenant. The third error of the Committee in the Kindler decision results from the first two. Assuming that Canada is implicitly authorized by article 6, paragraph 2, of the Covenant, to re-establish the death penalty, on the one hand, and to apply it in certain cases on the other, the Committee subjects Canada in paragraphs 14.3, 14.4 and 14.5, as if it were a non-abolitionist country, to a scrutiny of the obligations imposed on non-abolitionist States: penalty imposed only for the most serious crimes, judgement rendered by a competent court, etc. There is nothing to show that this is a correct interpretation of article 6. It must be possible to interpret every paragraph of an article of the Covenant separately, unless expressly stated otherwise in the text itself or deducible from its wording. That is not so in the present case. This analysis shows that, according to the Committee, Canada, which had abolished the death penalty on its territory, has by extraditing Mr. Kindler to the United States re-established it by proxy in respect of a certain category of persons under its jurisdiction. The fact that the Committee found it necessary to use both paragraphs in support of its argument clearly shows that each paragraph, taken separately, led to the opposite conclusion, namely, that a violation had occurred. I agree with this analysis but, unlike the Committee, I do not think that this behaviour is authorized by the Covenant. According to article 6, paragraph 1, no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life; this principle is absolute and admits of no exception. Moreover, having thus re-established the death penalty by proxy, Canada is limiting its application to a certain category of persons: those that are extraditable to the United States. Article 6, paragraph 2, begins with the words: "In countries which have not abolished the death penalty ...". This form of words requires a number of comments: It is negative and refers not to countries in which the death penalty exists but to those in which it has not been abolished. Abolition is the rule, retention of the death penalty the exception. Canada acknowledges its intention of so practising in order that it may not become a haven for criminals from the United States. Its intention is apparent from its decision not to seek assurances that the death penalty would not be applied in the event of extradition to the United States, as it is empowered to do by its bilateral extradition treaty with that country. Article 6, paragraph 2, refers only to countries in which the death penalty has not been abolished and thus rules out the application of the text to countries which have abolished the death penalty. Consequently, when extraditing persons in the position of Mr. Kindler, Canada is deliberately exposing them to the application of the death penalty in the requesting State. Lastly, the text imposes a series of obligations on the States in question. Consequently, by making a "joint" interpretation of the first two paragraphs of article 6 of the Covenant, the Committee has, in my view, committed three errors of law: In so doing, Canada's decision with regard to a person under its jurisdiction according to whether he is extraditable to the United States or not, constitutes a discrimination in violation of article 2, paragraph 1, and article 26 of the Covenant. One error, in that it is applying to a country which has abolished the death penalty, Canada, a text exclusively 127