18. Apart from the above considerations, which in my view demonstrate that there is no agreed or scientifically proven standard to determine that judicial execution by gas asphyxiation is more cruel and inhuman than other methods of judicial execution, the plea of the author's counsel contained in his submission to the Supreme Court of Canada (prior to Ng's extradition) which was made available to the Committee, in favour of "lethal injection" (as opposed to "lethal gas") speaks for itself. those remarks, the Government of Canada states, inter alia, the following: "While it may be that some methods of execution would clearly violate the Covenant, it is far from clear from a review of the wording of the Covenant and the comments and jurisprudence of the Committee, what point on the spectrum separates those methods of judicial execution which violate article 7 and those which do not". 19. The Committee observes in the present Views (paragraph 15.3) – and it has also held in the Kindler case (paragraph 6.4) – that the imposition of the death penalty (although, if I may add my personal view on this matter, capital punishment is in itself regrettable under any point of view and is obviously not in line with fundamental moral and ethic principles prevailing throughout Europe and other parts of the world) is still legally permissible under the Covenant. Logically, therefore, there must be methods of execution that are compatible with the Covenant. Although any judicial execution must be carried out in such a way as to cause the least possible physical and mental suffering (see the Committee's general comment 20 (44) on article 7 of the Covenant), physical and mental suffering will inevitably be one of the consequences of the imposition of the death penalty and its execution. To attempt to establish categories of methods of judicial executions, as long as such methods are not manifestly arbitrary and grossly contrary to the moral values of a democratic society and as long as such methods are based on a uniformly applicable legislation adopted by democratic processes, is futile, as it is futile to attempt to quantify the pain and suffering of any human being subjected to capital punishment. In this connection I should also like to refer to the considerations advanced in paragraph 9 of the joint individual opinion submitted by Mr. Waleed Sadi and myself in the Kindler case (decision of 30 July 1993, appendix). 15. This argument is in line with the view of Professor Cherif Bassiouni, who, in his analysis of what treatment could constitute "cruel and unusual punishment", comes to the following conclusion: "The wide divergence in penological theories and standards of treatment of offenders between countries is such that no uniform standard exists ... the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment can be said to constitute a general principle of international law because it is so regarded by the legal system of civilized nations, but that alone does not give it a sufficiently defined content bearing on identifiable applications capable of more than general recognition".1 16. In its submission, the Government of Canada furthermore stressed that "none of the methods currently in use in the United States is of such a nature as to constitute a violation of the Covenant or any other norm of international law. In particular, there is no indication that cyanide gas asphyxiation, which is the method of judicial execution in the State of California, is contrary to the Covenant or international law". Finally, the Government of Canada stated that it had examined "the method of execution for its possible effect on Ng on facts specified to him" and that it came to the conclusion that "there are no facts with respect to Ng which take him out of the general application outlined". In this context, the Government made explicit reference to the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of Those Facing the Death Penalty adopted by the Economic and Social Council in its resolution 1984/50 of 25 May 1984 and endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 39/118 of 14 December 1984. The Government of Canada has thus clearly taken into account a number of important elements in its assessment of whether the method of execution in California might constitute inhuman or degrading treatment. 20. It is therefore only logical that I also agree with the individual opinion expressed by a number of members of the Committee and attached to the present Views. Those members conclude that the Committee should not go into details in respect of executions as to whether acute pain of limited duration or less pain of longer duration is preferable and could be a criterion for the finding of a violation. 21. The Committee's finding that the specific method of judicial execution applied in California is tantamount to cruel and inhuman treatment and that accordingly Canada violated article 7 of the Covenant by extraditing Mr. Ng to the United States, is therefore, in my view, without a proper basis. 17. It is also evident from the foregoing that the defendant State has examined the whole issue in depth and did not deal with it in the cursory manner suggested in paragraph 16.3 of the Committee's Views. The author and his counsel were perfectly aware of this. Already in his letter of 26 October 1989 addressed to the author's counsel, the Minister of Justice of Canada stated as follows: In the present case the defendant State, Canada, has done its level best to respect its obligations under the Covenant "You have argued that the method employed to carry out capital punishment in California is cruel and inhuman, in itself. I have given consideration to this issue. The method used by California has been in place for a number of years and has found acceptance in the courts of the United States". 22. A final word ought to be said as far as Canada's obligations under the Covenant are concerned. 23. While recent developments in the jurisprudence of international organs entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring that individuals' human rights are fully respected by State authorities, suggest an expansion of their monitoring role (see, for example, the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the Soering case, 1 Cherif Bassiouni, International Extradition and World Public Order (Dobbs Ferry, Leyden, 1974), p. 465. 109