9. Further, Canada's misinterpretation of the rule in article 6, paragraph 2, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights raises the question of whether it has also violated article 5, specifically paragraph 2 thereof. The Government of Canada has interpreted article 6, paragraph 2, as authorizing the death penalty. For that reason, it has found that Mr. Charles Chitat Ng's extradition, even though he will necessarily be sentenced to death and will foreseeably be executed, would not be prohibited by the Covenant, since the latter would authorize the application of the death penalty. In making such a misinterpretation of the Covenant, the State party asserts that the extradition of the author of the communication would not be contrary to the Covenant. In this connection, Canada has denied Mr. Charles Chitat Ng a right which he enjoyed under its jurisdiction, adducing that the Covenant would give a lesser protection than internal law – in other words, that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights would recognize the right to life in a lesser degree than Canadian legislation. In so far as the misinterpretation of article 6, paragraph 2, has led Canada to consider that the Covenant recognizes the right to life in a lesser degree than its domestic legislation and has used that as a pretext to extradite the author to a jurisdiction where he will certainly be executed, Canada has also violated article 5, paragraph 2, of the Covenant. extraditing Mr. Ng without taking into account the Special Rapporteur's request, Canada failed to display the good faith which ought to prevail among the parties to the Protocol and the Covenant. 13. Moreover, this fact gives rise to the possibility that there may also have been a violation of article 26 of the Covenant. Canada has given no explanation as to why the extradition was carried out so rapidly once it was known that the author had submitted a communication to the Committee. By its action in failing to observe its obligations to the international community, the State party has prevented the enjoyment of the rights which the author ought to have had as a person under Canadian jurisdiction in relation to the Optional Protocol. In so far as the Optional Protocol forms part of the Canadian legal order, all persons under Canadian jurisdiction enjoy the right to submit communications to the Human Rights Committee so that it may hear their complaints. Since it appears that Mr. Charles Chitat Ng was extradited on account of his nationality,3 and in so far as he has been denied the possibility of enjoying its protection in accordance with the Optional Protocol, I find that the State party has also violated article 26 of the Covenant. 14. In conclusion, I find Canada to be in violation of articles 5, paragraph 2, 6 and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 10. I have to insist that Canada has misinterpreted article 6, paragraph 2, and that, when it abolished the death penalty, it became impossible for it to apply that penalty directly in its territory, except for the military offences for which it is still in force, or indirectly through the handing over to another State of a person who runs the risk of being executed or who will be executed. Since it abolished the death penalty, Canada has to guarantee the right to life of all persons within its jurisdiction, without any limitation. [Spanish original] 3 The various passages in the reply which refer to the relations between Canada and the United States, the 4,800 kilometres of unguarded frontier between the two countries and the growing number of extradition applications by the United States to Canada should be taken into account. The State party has indicated that United States fugitives cannot be permitted to take the non-extradition of the author in the absence of assurances as an incentive to flee to Canada. In this connection, the arguments of the State party were identical to those put forward in relation to communication No. 470/1991. 11. With regard to the possible violation of article 7 of the Covenant, I do not concur with the Committee's finding that "in the instant case and on the basis of the information before it, the Committee concludes that execution by gas asphyxiation, should the death penalty be imposed on the author, would not meet the test of least possible physical and mental suffering and constitutes cruel and inhuman treatment, in violation of article 7 of the Covenant" (Views, para. 16.4). I cannot agree with the view that the execution of the death penalty constitutes cruel and inhuman treatment only in these circumstances. On the contrary, I consider that the death penalty as such constitutes treatment that is cruel, inhuman and degrading and hence contrary to article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Nevertheless, in the present case, it is my view that the consideration of the application of the death penalty is subsumed by the violation of article 6, and I do not find that article 7 of the Covenant has been specifically violated. H. INDIVIDUAL OPINION SUBMITTED BY MS. CHRISTINE CHANET (DISSENTING) As regards the application of article 6 in the present case, I can only repeat the terms of my separate opinion expressed in the case of John Kindler v. Canada (communication No. 470/1991). Consequently, I am unable to accept the statement, in paragraph 16.2 of the decision, that "article 6, paragraph 2, permits the imposition of capital punishment". In my view, the text of the Covenant does not authorize the imposition, or restoration, of capital punishment in those countries which have abolished it; it simply sets conditions with which the State must necessarily comply when capital punishment exists. 12. One final aspect to be dealt with is the way in which Mr. Ng was extradited. No notice was taken of the request made by the Special Rapporteur on New Communications, under rule 86 of the rules of procedure of the Human Rights Committee, that the author should not be extradited while the case was under consideration by the Committee. On ratifying the Optional Protocol, Canada undertook, with the other States parties, to comply with the procedures followed in connection therewith. In Drawing inferences from a de facto situation cannot, in law, be assimilated to an authorization. As regards article 7, I share the Committee's conclusion that this provision has been violated in the present case. 112