hierarchy. Their salaries are paid by the Ministry of Justice; (d) The president and the members of the Supreme Military Court have to take an oath before they take up their appointment. They swear or vow to act in a fair and impartial way; (e) The president and the members of the Supreme Military Court do not owe any obedience nor are they accountable to any one regarding their decisions; (f) As a rule the sessions of the Supreme Military Court are public. form of violence, he could not act in any other way than he did. By prosecuting him, the State party has violated his right to freedom of conscience. 3.11 The Supreme Military Court rejected this defence by referring to the Act on Conscientious Objection to Military Service, under which the author could have applied for substitute civilian service. According to the author, however, his conscience prevents him from filing a request under the Act on Conscientious Objection to Military Service. 3.12 Finally, the author alleges another violation of article 26 of the Covenant, on the ground that the Military Penal Code, unlike the Penal Code, makes no provisions for an appeal against the summons. According to the author, it is inconceivable that civilians who become soldiers should be discriminated vis-à-vis other civilians. 4.4 The State party points out that national and international judgements have confirmed the impartiality and independence of the military courts in the Netherlands. Reference is made to the Engel Case of the European Court of Human Rights1 and to the judgement of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands of 17 May 1988. State party's observations and author's clarifications 4.5 With regard to the exhaustion of domestic remedies, the State party claims that the Act on Conscientious Objection to Military Service (Wet Gewetensbezwaren Militaire Dienst) is an effective remedy to insuperable objections to military service. The State party contends that as the author has not invoked the Act, he has thus failed to exhaust domestic remedies. 4.1 The State party notes that a State's right to require its citizens to perform military service, or substitute service in the case of conscientious objectors whose grounds for objection are recognized by the State, is, as such, not contested. Reference is made to article 8, paragraph 3 (c) (ii), of the Covenant. 4.6 With regard to the alleged violation concerning the absence of a right to appeal against the initial summons, the Government refers to the decision on admissibility by the Human Rights Committee in respect of communications Nos. 267/1987 and 245/1987, which raised the same issue. The Government therefore submits that this part of the present communication should be deemed inadmissible. 4.2 The State party states that Jehovah's Witnesses have been exempted from military service since 1974. Amendments to the Conscription Act, which are being prepared in order to make provision for the hearing of "total objectors", continue to provide for the exemption of Jehovah's Witnesses. In the view of the Government, membership of Jehovah's Witnesses constitutes strong evidence that the objections to military service are based on genuine religious convictions. Therefore, they automatically qualify for exemption. However, this does not exclude the possibility for other individuals to invoke the Act on Conscientious Objection to Military Service. 4.7 The State party contends that the other elements of the applicant's communication are unsubstantiated. It concludes that the author has no claim under article 2 of the Optional Protocol and that his communication should accordingly be declared inadmissible. 4.3 The Government takes the view that the independence and impartiality of the Supreme Military Court in the Netherlands is guaranteed by the following procedures and provisions: 5.1 In his reply to the State party's observations the author claims that the Conscientious Objection Act has a limited scope and that it may be invoked only by conscripts who meet the requirements of section 2 of the Act. The author rejects the assertion that section 2 is sufficiently broad to cover the objections maintained by "total objectors" to conscription and substitute civilian service. He argues that the question is not whether the author (a) The president and the member jurist of the Supreme Military Court are judges in the Court of Appeal (Gerechtshof) in The Hague, and remain president and member jurist as long as they are members of the Court of Appeal; (b) The military members of the Supreme Military Court are appointed by the Crown. They are discharged after reaching 70 years of age; 1 Publications of the European Court of Human Rights, Series A: Judgements and Decisions, vol. 22, p. 37, para. 89. (c) The military members of the Supreme Military Court do not hold any function in the military 53