CAT/C/32/D/183/2001 Page 10 5(b), of the Convention and Rule 107(e), of the Committee’s rules of procedure, because the complaint had not exhausted remedies under the new Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA) procedure. Subsidiarily, the State party maintains that the complaint is without merit. 6.2 The State party submits that, under the new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act of 28 June 2002, any person awaiting removal from Canada is entitled to a further risk assessment, based on fresh evidence, which automatically stays the removal order, if submitted within 15 days of the notification informing the applicant of the possibility to apply for PRRA protection. The assessment is conducted by a PRRA officer trained to apply the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, as well as the Convention against Torture. In case of a negative PRRA determination, the applicant may apply for leave to apply for judicial review to the Federal Court, which can grant relief on grounds of a simple error of law or manifestly erroneous findings of fact. A decision of the Federal Court Trial Division can be appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal, if the judge of the Trial Division certifies that the case raises a serious question of general importance. The Appeal Court’s decision is subject to further appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. The applicant can apply to the Federal Court for an interim order staying removal pending the outcome of his applications and appeals before that Court. 6.3 The State party contends that, like the PDRCC risk assessment in the former legislation, the Pre-Removal Risk Assessment constitutes an effective remedy10; the same has been held by the Committee against Torture and the Human Rights Committee with respect to the remedy of judicial review.11 6.4 In addition, the State party rejects the complainant’s argument that the Federal Court twice acknowledged his risk of being tortured upon return to India, arguing that the stay order of 2 October 1998 and the decision of 24 November 1999 on one of his applications for judicial review cannot be considered judicial findings of fact that the author would be at such a risk. 6.5 The State party challenges the documentary evidence produced by the author, on the basis (a) that the affidavit of Mr. S.S.S., who was able to spend four months in the Punjab in 1997 despite the fact that he had been granted refugee status in Canada, was merely based on statements of the complainant’s family and friends in the Punjab and was as such self-serving and of little weight; (b) that the reports and studies on past human rights violations in the Punjab are insufficient to make out a personal and present risk of torture for the complainant, should he be deported to India; and (c) that the two medical reports of 1995 only referred to previous physical injuries, without making reference to post-traumatic stress disorder, which had been mentioned for the first time in the 1999 report, five years after the complainant made his refugee claim. 10 In relation to the PDRCC risk assessment, the State party cites the Human Rights Committee’s decisions on Communication No. 603/1994, Badu v. Canada, at para. 6.2; Communication No. 604/1994, Nartey v. Canada, at para. 6.2; Communication No. 654/1995, at para. 6.2. 11 Apart from the above cited decisions of the Human Rights Committee, reference is made to the decisions of the Committee against Torture on complaints No. 66/1997, P.S.S. v. Canada, at para. 6.2; No. 86/1997, P.S. v. Canada, at para. 6.2; No. 42/1996, R.K. v. Canada, at para. 7.2; No. 95/1997, L.O. v. Canada, at para. 6.5; No. 22/1995, M.A. v. Canada, at para. 3.