CAT/C/54/D/550/2013 ongoing and consistent reports of serious human rights abuses inflicted by or at the instigation or with the consent or acquiescence of public officials or other persons acting in official capacities in the northern Caucasus, including Chechnya, including torture and illtreatment, abductions, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings (see CAT/C/RUS/CO/5, para. 13). However, the Committee reiterates that the occurrence of human rights violations in his or her country of origin is not sufficient in itself for it to conclude that a complainant runs a personal risk of torture.23 7.7 The Committee further notes that the State party has drawn attention to inconsistencies and contradictions in the complainants’ accounts and submissions that cast doubts regarding the complainants’ general credibility and the veracity of their claims. In particular, the complainants have never sympathized with the resistance movement in Chechnya nor taken part in its activities. In this regard, the Committee takes note of the State party’s submission that the complainants’ sons/brothers were granted asylum in Sweden in 2002 and 2006, respectively, since at the time of their application there was an internal armed conflict in Chechnya, and not on grounds of an individual need for protection. The complainants have not alleged that their sons/brothers were active in the rebel movement, other than by occasionally providing food and medicine for rebels, before they left Chechnya. Consequently, there are reasons to question the alleged interest by the Chechen authorities in the remaining family and its continued harassment of them so many years later. In addition, according to the available country-of-origin information, a substantial part of the population in Chechnya has supported rebels at some point; however, the authorities are currently not interested in people who have done so only sporadically. Moreover, the Chechen authorities focus on persons who are suspected of having supported or collaborated with high-profile rebels and have given substantial support for a longer period of time.24 In this regard, the Committee observes that the complainants’ sons/brothers left the Russian Federation in 2002 and 2006 and that the complainants do not allege that the sons/brothers, since their departure, have been in contact with the rebels or that they have supported them whatsoever. 7.8 Further, the Committee also takes note of the State party’s submission that the complainants’ descriptions of the masked men who visited their apartment and threatened them were vague and of a general nature and that it is only an assumption on the complainants’ part that the masked men had a connection to the authorities. In this connection, the Committee observes that no evidence had been brought forward to support the complainants’ allegation that they had been ill-treated and threatened by the Chechen authorities. Moreover, the Committee notes that the complainants have not provided any medical documentation attesting that the first complainant was subjected to ill-treatment in November 2010. Further, as the Swedish migration authorities noted during the domestic proceedings, the complainants remained in their home despite the alleged threats. The third complainant did move to her uncle’s home after the last visit by the masked men, but the complainants did not consider the threat to be so serious that she could not complete her studies at the local secondary school. In addition, the conduct of the complainants indicated that they considered that moving the third complainant to Grozny would be sufficient to eliminate the threats against her. Furthermore, the complainants submitted their internal passports to the Swedish authorities in order to support their identities. According to the stamps in the passports and the complainants’ own account the passports were issued in 2009 and 2010 by the competent authorities in Grozny. In this connection, the Committee observes that the complainants were able to obtain these passports from the Chechen 23 24 See, for example, T.M. v. Republic of Korea, para. 9.7. See the Swedish Migration Board’s country profile of the Russian Federation, pp. 23–24. 13