CAT/C/56/D/536/2013 stay of proceedings with respect to the private information. The State party notes that the decision to direct a stay of the private prosecution was an independent exercise of prosecutorial discretion by the Criminal Justice Branch of the Ministry of Justice of British Columbia. The State party notes that, although it was a provincial Crown prosecutor who directed the stay of the private prosecution, the absence of consent on the part of the Attorney General of Canada would in any case have resulted in the discontinuation of the proceedings once the eight-day time limit had passed. 4.10 The State party submits that the allegation of a violation of article 5 (2) of the Convention is inadmissible pursuant to article 22 (2) as an abuse of the right of submission because the allegation has not been substantiated. The Criminal Code provides extended jurisdiction over the crime of torture, as required by the terms of article 5 of the Convention. Paragraph (e) of subsection 3.7 of section 7 of the Criminal Code extends the State party’s criminal jurisdiction over all acts of torture committed outside of the national territory if “the person who commits the act or omission is, after the commission thereof, present in Canada”. The State party submits that article 5, in both paragraph 1 and paragraph 2, requires States parties to establish jurisdiction over the crime of torture in the specified circumstances. The State party notes that in their communication the complainants acknowledge that the State party has extended its jurisdiction over foreign acts of torture as required by article 5 (2). 4.11 The State party submits that the Committee lacks competence to consider the alleged violations as the complainants are not Canadian citizens and are not and have not been subject to the jurisdiction of the State party, which is a requirement for a complaint under article 22 of the Convention. The State party observes that the communication itself provides certain details concerning t he past and current location of each of the complainants without establishing in any way that any of them were present in the territory of the State party or subject to its jurisdiction at any time relevant to the complaint. Moreover, the complainants have made no attempt to establish that they were subject to the jurisdiction of the State party at any relevant time. The State party does not accept that the complainants were subject to its jurisdiction by reason of the laying of the “private information” or at any relevant time and submits that they are not now within the jurisdiction of the State party. The State party has never accepted and does not accept the competence of the Committee to hear communications from individuals not subject to its jurisdiction. 4.12 The State party notes that the Committee has taken a potentially contrary view in Guengueng et al. v. Senegal, 26 where the Committee rejected the inadmissibility argument of Senegal on the basis of its lack of jurisdiction over the victims. The Committee appeared to have taken the view that the Chadian claimants had become subject to the jurisdiction of Senegal in instituting proceedings against Hissène Habré in the Senegalese courts. 27 The Committee expressed the view that the principle of universal jurisdiction enunciated in articles 5 (2) and 7 of the Convention implies that the jurisdiction of States parties must extend to potential complainants in circumstances similar to the complainants’. 28 The State party maintains that this view, which suggests that complainants need not be subject to the jurisdiction of the State party, is inconsistent with the explicit text of article 22 (1) of the Convention, which clearly requires that complainants must be or have been subject to the jurisdiction of the State with respect to the violations of which they claim to be victim. 4.13 The State party further refers to the decision of the Committee in Rosenmann v. Spain, 29 where it considered that the complainant was not a victim of the alleged 26 27 28 29 10 See note 23 above. See Guengueng et al. v. Senegal, para. 6.3. Ibid., para. 6.4. Communication No. 176/2000, decision adopted on 30 April 2002.