161. While the United States likely had authority to detain some of the Guantánamo detainees based on their direct participation in hostilities, ODIHR is concerned that other detainees allegedly apprehended and detained under international humanitarian law may in fact have been detained based on the particular circumstances in which they found themselves rather than their involvement in any direct participation in hostilities on their part.207 Reports that find that over 90 per cent of all detainees were not captured by US or coalition forces and that bounties were paid in exchange for handing people over to US authorities raise numerous questions about the basis for their capture and subsequent detention.208 162. Following the end of active hostilities in an international armed conflict, prisoners of war must be released without delay unless they are subject to pending criminal proceedings for, or convicted of, an indictable offence.209 Similarly, civilians are to be released once the reasons for their detention no longer exist and, at the latest, “as soon as possible after the close of hostilities”.210 Detainees captured in connection with the international armed conflict in Afghanistan should therefore have been charged or released once the active hostilities in that conflict ceased.211 However, from July 2002 to December 2002, only five detainees were transferred from Guantánamo. In 2003, 88 detainees were transferred from Guantánamo while 655 people remained in detention.212 To date, only 30 Guantánamo detainees have been charged, and the charges against 15 of those individuals were dropped without prejudice.213 163. The continued detention of approximately 79 people apprehended prior to July 2002 amounts to more than 13 years of detention following the end of the international armed conflict in Afghanistan. While international humanitarian law may allow for a reasonable period of time to pass before repatriation, ODIHR does not view a period of several years, or indeed 13 years, to be reasonable. On the contrary, it holds the view that such a period of time constitutes an “unjustifiable delay”.214 Accordingly, ODIHR considers that the 207 Numerous reports have alleged that many detainees were simply in the wrong place at the wrong time. See, for instance, The Report of The Constitution Project's Task Force on Detainee Treatment, op. cit., note 183, p. 66; ODIHR interview with Brent Rushforth, 2 April 2014, where he explained that his client, Abdurrahman Abdallah Ali Mahmoud al Shubati, is a scholar who went to Afghanistan to teach the Koran, and that there was nothing in his records to justify his detention at Guantánamo; ODIHR interview with Michael E. Mone, 11 March 2014: Mone explained that after talking with his client, Oybek Jabbarov, it was apparent that he was simply another one of the Guantánamo mistakes and had been in the wrong place at the wrong time. He had already lived in northern Afghanistan for two years before the attack in 2001. He got a ride with some soldiers one day who handed him over to US authorities. Then he was detained for eight years; Resolution P6_TA(2007)0032, “Transportation and illegal detention of prisoners: European Parliament resolution on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners”, European Parliament, 30 January 2007, para. 84, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A6-2007-0020&language=EN>: “all investigations concluded, as early as the end of October 2002, that Murat Kurnaz posed no terrorist threat”. Kurnaz was apprehended by Pakistani authorities on a bus during a routine check. 208 Denbeaux, Denbeaux et al., Report on Guantanamo Detainees: A Profile of 517 Detainees”, op. cit., note 201, pp. 2-3; The Report of The Constitution Project's Task Force on Detainee Treatment, op. cit., note 183, p. 66. 209 Third Geneva Convention, Arts. 118, 119(5); UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism, Report to the General Assembly, A/63/223, op. cit., note 55, para. 21. 210 Fourth Geneva Convention, Arts. 132-133. 211 UN Special Procedures, “Situation of detainees at Guantánamo Bay”, op. cit., note 23, paras. 22-24. 212 “The Guantánamo Docket”, The New York Times website, op. cit., note 88. 213 This statistic does not differentiate between detainees who were apprehended in the context of, or outside of, the international armed conflict in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, it illustrates the very small number of individuals who have been charged before the military commissions in comparison to the number of detainees. 214 API, Art. 85(4)(b); “Customary International Humanitarian Law, Rule 128”, ICRC website, op. cit., note 141. 66