transferred other individuals it apprehended to third countries so that they could secretly detain and interrogate these individuals on its behalf.172 The CIA received the authority to detain individuals from the Memorandum of Notification (MON) issued by President Bush on 17 September 2001. It is said to have authorized the CIA to “detain persons who pose a continuing, serious threat of violence or death to US persons and interests or who are planning terrorist activities”. The CIA was also reportedly given “significant discretion” to determine who to detain, the reasons for detention and the length of detention.173 Ultimately, the CIA RDI programme included acts of enforced disappearances, secret detentions, unlawful inter-state transfers and torture and ill-treatment.174 151. This section of the report focuses primarily on the situation of those detainees who were subsequently transferred to Guantánamo under military custody, and, to a certain extent, under CIA detention. It explores the issues raised by the programme insofar as they relate to the prohibition of arbitrary detention. The detention and interrogation practices inflicted on the detainees as part of the CIA RDI programme are analysed in further detail in Part 1II-A. 152. Following the issuance of the MON, the CIA allegedly instructed personnel that they could go beyond the authority provided for in the MON and “detain individuals who might not be high-value targets (…), but could provide information on high-value targets”.175 The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s Study on the CIA RDI Programme determined that the CIA detained at least 119 individuals as part of this programme.176 This would have included 26 persons who did not meet the standard for detention authorized by the MON. In addition to these 26 people, it was reported that the CIA disagreed internally about whether the detention of some of the other individuals met the MON standard for detention, and that numerous individuals detained were subsequently found not to be persons who “pose a continuing threat or violence” or who were “planning terrorist activities”.177 153. President Bush publicly acknowledged the existence of the CIA RDI programme in September 2006, following the transfer of 14 so-called “high-value detainees” to 172 For instance, Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah were detained in a CIA secret detention facility in Poland. ECtHR, Al Nashiri v. Poland, Application No. 28761/11, 24 July 2014, <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001146044>; ECtHR, Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, Application No. 7511/13, 24 July 2014, para. 496, <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-146047>; UN Special Procedures, “Joint study on global practices in relation to secret detention”, op. cit., note 109, para. 141. 173 Senate Study on the CIA RDI Programme, Executive Summary, op. cit., note 171, pp. 11, 13. 174 Dick Marty, “Alleged secret detentions and unlawful inter-state transfers of detainees involving Council of Europe member states”, Council of Europe Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Doc. 10957, 12 June 2006, para. 5, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/droi/dv/306_martydetentionsfirst_/306_martydetentionsfirst_e n.pdf>; Dick Marty, “Secret detentions and illegal transfers of detainees involving Council of Europe member states: second report”, Council of Europe Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Doc. 11302 rev, 11 June 2007, paras. 1-2, <http://www.assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewPDF.asp?FileID=11555&Language=EN>; ECtHR, Al Nashiri v. Poland, op. cit., note 172, paras. 390, 398, 401, 417, 530-532. 175 Senate Study on the CIA RDI Programme, Executive Summary, op. cit., note 171, p. 13. 176 Ibid., p. 14: “While the CIA has represented in public and classified settings that it detained ‘fewer than one hundred’ individuals, the Committee's review of CIA records indicates that the total number of CIA detainees was at least 119. Internal CIA documents indicate that inadequate record keeping made it impossible for the CIA to determine how many individuals it had detained.” 177 Ibid., p. 16. 61