CAT/C/75 page 77 60 This view has been upheld in diverse rulings by Mexican courts. The one on page 470, volume XXV, fifth term, Federal Judicial Weekly, First Division, reads: “CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS. The prosecution of crimes is the responsibility of the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the judicial police, which is under the authority and immediate orders of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and since this is a constitutional guarantee providing that accused persons must be tried by justices not belonging to the judicial police, which is subordinate to the Public Prosecutor’s Office, this guarantee would be denied if the justices were subordinate to the Public Prosecutor’s Office and thus became both judges and parties, responsible for deciding whether the accused person was criminally responsible and for presenting ex officio the necessary evidence on which to base the charge. Hence the Public Prosecutor’s Office must be involved from the outset of the investigation onwards, because the constitutional guarantee at issue requires the courts to be entirely impervious to influence, and they would be influenced, prejudicially, if they were obliged and empowered to assemble evidence against the accused. The courts must confine themselves to receiving evidence from the parties, as provided for by law, but without making any effort either in favour or against the accused, so that they may protect their independence and impartiality; and any provisions of local legislation which give the courts judicial police powers are inapplicable in any case, being contrary to article 21 of the Constitution; any unofficial procedures which the courts follow in finding the accused guilty are thus null and void; it is not enough, in order to validate them, that the Public Prosecutor’s Office should institute criminal proceedings in second instance, since such proceedings will be based on procedures known to be invalid. Nor does the consistent practice of the courts in one State of instituting proceedings without the intervention of the Public Prosecutor’s Office afford grounds for accepting such a course of action as legal since, far from constituting grounds in itself for engaging in such practice, the frequent violation of a constitutional precept is more than sufficient grounds for refraining from doing so.” Another judgement on page 787, volume CXXVI, fifth term, Federal Judicial Weekly, First Division, is similar in content and reads: “JUDGES DECISION-MAKING POWER OF. The fact that the responsible authority does not agree with the conclusions reached by the Public Prosecutor’s Office is not a violation of guarantees. According to the Mexican constitutional system based on article 21 of the Constitution, the courts have sole and exclusive authority to impose penalties and this decision-making function cannot be left to the discretion of the parties. The objective is legal certainty and it is therefore the judge who has decision-making power. Since he is the most senior person involved in legal proceedings and takes his decision in accordance with his sovereign power, this power to impose penalties, which entails the highest authority to represent the State, cannot be delegated to any of the parties. On the basis of the separation of powers, the imposition of penalties is the responsibility of the judge, while the Public Prosecutor’s Office is responsible for prosecuting crimes, putting forward its position in the form of arguments, not decisions because, otherwise, this authority would be left to the discretion of one of the parties and this would be inconsistent with Mexican constitutional principles.” The opinion on page 449, volume XXVI, fifth term, Federal Judicial Weekly, First Division, clearly states that it is the responsibility of the Public Prosecutor’s Office to monitor compliance with the law in the courts, so that the outcome of most criminal proceedings before the judicial authorities depends, inter alia, on allegations and evidence submitted by the