it applied to the police, members of the administration of the state, and the armed forces.98 The issue is best regarded as undecided. It could certainly be argued that the state’s interest could be adequately protected by restrictions on the taking of industrial action rather than on membership of unions per se. This conclusion favouring a proportionate response is also supported by the outcome of domestic challenges to such restrictions in the constitutional courts of Poland and Spain. In Poland in 2000, the Constitutional Court ruled that a ban on membership of trade unions in the military was constitutional provided there were alternative means of exercising the right to freedom of association.99 In Spain, the Constitutional Court ruled in 2000 that members of the armed forces had a constitutional right to participate in bodies representing their social and economic interests, provided these bodies did not intend to engage in industrial action.100 Different approaches Approaches to the recognition of freedom of association within OSCE participating States vary from countries that prohibit such bodies entirely, to those that have officially sponsored (non-autonomous) associations, to those that allow military associations or unions that are usually, though there are some exceptions, subject to a restriction on the taking of strike action. The first approach is a paternalistic one that focuses on the chain of command. Traditionally, the military commander has seen it as his or her task to ensure the welfare (for example, food, housing, health) of those serving in the armed forces. Hence, the rights of individual members of the armed forces to associate are restricted, and military associations or industrial action are prohibited. This approach treats the welfare of members of the armed forces as a prerequisite of operational effectiveness. Grievances of individual members of the armed forces are referred through the chain of command; no machinery is provided for collective grievances. Restrictions on association may also be balanced (as in Canada) by strong legal rights for servicemen and -women to raise individual complaints with an independent military ombudsman or with external human rights bodies (see Chapter 22, “Ombudsmen”). However, in other countries — notably Germany — such systems exist alongside military associations. The chain-of-command approach has the disadvantage, however, of merging the distinct interests of the military as a whole and of individual members. Separate treatment and representation of these viewpoints may make for clearer and more structured decisionmaking. Moreover, the absence of direct representation of the interests of members of the armed forces may lead to their representation indirectly, e.g., by groups representing veterans, retired members of the services, or the families of active servicemen and -women. In some countries, these groups are little more than an unofficial method of representing the interests of serving members of the armed forces and have a large (undeclared) membership of serving soldiers. Alternatively, cultural groups that servicemen and -women are permitted to participate in may assume the role prohibited to military associations. Vicarious or indirect representation of these kinds may to some extent fill the vacuum of direct representation, but they do so as a second best. 98  Ibid., para. 61. In its earlier admissibility decision in the Council of Civil Service Unions case, however, the Commission found that the term “lawful restrictions” in the second sentence of para. 2 of Art. 11 could include a prohibition of arbitrariness, though it did not pronounce itself firmly on this matter. 99  Polish Constitutional Court, Judgment K 26/28 of 7 March 2000. 100  Nolte, op. cit., note 6, p. 84. 70 Handbook on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Armed Forces Personnel