after a volunteer has enlisted, especially if the serviceman or -woman’s religious or other beliefs change. In addition, a person who does not have a general objection to the use of violence or the taking of life may nevertheless have a conscientious objection to a particular military campaign that they regard, for example, as immoral or contrary to international law. This is sometimes referred to as “selective conscientious objection” and is discussed later in this chapter. All of these situations raise common concerns, on the one hand of giving effective protection so that people are not compelled to act against their deepest convictions, but on the other hand of the need for the authorities to be satisfied that the conscientious objection is genuine and not an attempt to evade legal responsibilities. The question of assessing the authenticity of beliefs is by no means unique to conscientious objection, nor is it unresolvable. It arises in many other contexts in which the law recognizes the freedom to act upon religious beliefs.106 A state may either take a claim of conscientious objection at face value (particularly where there is little or no other advantage in making insincere claims), or, as many states do, it may establish a formal process for testing the sincerity of an individual’s professed beliefs through an inquiry by a panel of some type. Where states recognize conscientious objection to conscription, they generally do so by providing for alternative or substitute service in non-military work for other public authorities, such as health care, social services, or education. There may nevertheless be issues concerning whether the alternative service is comparable to military service. Clearly, if it is perceived as significantly less onerous, then there may be an incentive for insincere claims of conscientious objection. On the other hand, if alternative service is significantly more onerous, it may be seen as a form of punishment of, or deterrence to, conscientious objectors. Moreover, the making of a strict comparison between military service and alternative service may be difficult because of features of conscription that may have no civil counterpart: a requirement to live in barracks, to take part in military exercises, or even to be deployed to the battlefield, for example. A number of issues also remain concerning the practical recognition of conscientious objection. As detailed in a recent report from the UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, these include: the basis on which conscientious exemption from military service can be granted and the process for obtaining such exemption; the provision, length and conditions of alternative service and the rights of those who object to alternative service; whether alternative service provides the same rights and social benefits as military service; the length and conditions of alternative service; and whether there can be repeated punishment for failure to perform military service … [the] lack of an independent decision-making process, disproportionate lengthy alternative service and States parties that recognize the right to conscientious objection in a discriminatory manner, e.g. by granting exemption only to religious groups and not others.107 106  R. Ahdar and I. Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), ch. 6. 107  “Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Conscientious Objection to Military Service: Analytical report of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on best practices in relation to conscientious objection to military service”, United Nations Economic and Social Council, E/CN.4/2006/51, Commission for Human Rights, 62nd session, 27 February 2006, available at <http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/ sessions/62/listdocs.htm> (under “Item 11”). 75 Handbook on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Armed Forces Personnel