Limitations on religious freedom Freedom of religion is a qualified right (see Chapter 5, “International Human Rights Law”). For example, it is possible for a state to limit the right to manifest religious belief under Art. 9 ECHR if the limitations are prescribed by law “in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. It is notable that the list of possible grounds for limitation does not include the interests of national security (unlike, for example, Art. 8 or Arts. 10 and 11; see Box 11.6). In practice, however, as the approach of the European Court of Human Rights shows, armed forces may legitimately limit the right in ways that reflect military discipline for reasons of public order or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Any such limits must be “prescribed by law” and “necessary in a democratic society” (see Chapter 5, “International Human Rights Law”). In part (although this obviously applies only to regular servicemen and -women and not to conscripts), limits may result from what the Court takes as the voluntary surrender of the right to manifest one’s religion by the individual by submitting to military life. The European Court of Human Rights, in Kalaç v. Turkey,178 held that the dismissal of a senior legal adviser in the Turkish air force did not violate Art. 9, which protects freedom of thought, belief, and conscience. The Court ruled that he had been dismissed for having adopted “unlawful fundamentalist opinions”. The Turkish government argued that the complainant had manifested a lack of commitment to the secularist foundation of the Turkish state. The Court held that the complainant had voluntarily accepted limitations on manifestation of his beliefs in embracing a system of military discipline. Within these limitations, he was permitted to pray five times daily, to observe Ramadan, and to attend Friday prayers. The dismissal was found to be based on his conduct and attitude rather than the way in which he manifested his religion. In the words of the Court, “in exercising his freedom to manifest his religion, an individual may need to take his specific situation into account”.179 The limitations here on his rights, said the Court, were self-chosen.180 The vulnerable position of junior military personnel may also justify additional restrictions on the religious liberty of members of the armed forces. In a case from Greece, the European Court of Human Rights found that convictions of Pentecostal servicemen for proselytism of other (subordinate) airmen were not contrary to Art. 9.181 It was permissible for the Greek authorities to protect subordinates in this way from the unwanted religious attentions of their superiors, and it was relevant that the measures were not disproportionate since they were “not particularly severe and were more preventative than punitive in nature”.182 3. Different Approaches The approach that a state takes to the religious liberty of its employees is inevitably coloured to some degree by the approach that it takes to religion generally. As mentioned above, states with a constitutional commitment to secularism may tend to take a narrower view of the permitted manifestation of religious belief. In the French armed forces, for exam- 178  Kalaç v. Turkey, European Court of Human Rights, 1 July 1997, European Human Rights Reports, Vol. 27, 1999, p. 552. 179  Ibid., para. 27. 180  Ibid., para. 28. 181  Larissis v. Greece, European Court of Human Rights, 24 February 1998, European Human Rights Reports, Vol. 27, 1999, p. 329. 182  Proselytism of civilians was treated differently, however. Here, the authorities could not intervene since the potential element of misuse of power was absent. Ibid., paras. 58-61. 93 Handbook on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Armed Forces Personnel