10 CDL-AD(2013)019 national human rights institutions, covering their composition, powers, financial autonomy and methods of operation, is envisaged in national legislation, including at the constitutional level. 28. Next to its general tasks, the Law should also outline explicitly the relationship between the Higher Committee, and the President, parliament and government, and other relevant public institutions. In this context, the independent nature of the institution would require it to assist all state powers, while maintaining an appropriate distance to the executive and legislative branches of state. Additionally, it is essential that such institution assume its proper place within the constitutional system. 29. At the same time, the Law should specify that all public institutions and state officials are obliged to cooperate with the Higher Committee. Any lack or ability to do so should be appropriately justified. The Law should include specified deadlines for responding to the Higher Committee’s requests. It is of key importance also that the Law clearly states that medical confidentiality and other reasons for maintaining confidentiality of data may not be invoked in response the Higher Committee‘s requests for information. As foreseen in the Paris Principles, the Law should state explicitly that the Higher Committee shall be empowered to “hear any person and obtain any information and any documents necessary for assessing situations falling within its competence”. 30. In relation to the report-writing tasks of the Higher Committee outlined in Article 3 of the Law, it should be noted that, rather than draft the government’s submissions to UN human rights bodies, the role of a national human rights institution is habitually to advise on and review such reports, but not to write them. In line with the Higher Committee’s standing as an autonomous and independent institution, it would be advisable to amend this provision; at the same time, national human rights institutions may always be encouraged to prepare shadow reports for relevant proceedings before the above bodies. 31. It is welcomed that the Chairman of the Higher Committee can visit rehabilitation, penal and detention facilities, centres for housing and watching over children, and social institutions for people with specific needs (Article 5). At these visits, he/she may be assisted by two members of the aforesaid Committee in the course of his assignment. It is particularly laudable that Article 5 covers a wide array of institutions where persons are deprived of their liberty, and that such visits may be undertaken ex officio, and without prior notice. 32. The Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (hereinafter “OPCAT”), which Tunisia acceded to in mid-2011, sets up “a system of regular visits undertaken by independent international and national bodies to places where people are deprived of their liberty, in order to prevent torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” (Article 1 of the OPCAT). Given the formulation of Article 5, the Higher Committee could well be, or become the designated national preventive mechanism that Article 3 of the OPCAT requires signatory States to set up.12 33. Regardless of whether the Higher Committee shall become, or continue to be, the designated national preventive mechanism for Tunisia, Article 5 should be amended so that not only the Chairman, assisted by two Committee members, may visit places where people are deprived of their liberty. Instead, this right should be granted to the Committee as a whole and such visits should be undertaken by specific Committee members selected due to their relevant knowledge and expertise in different areas, e.g. torture, health, psychology, among others, while ensuring gender, and perhaps also regional balance (see Article 18 par 2 of the OPCAT). Such visits should be conducted regularly; the lack of prior notice, and the ability to conduct them at a time of the Higher Committee’s choosing should be maintained. The aim of such visits should not only be the enforcement of national laws, as currently stated in Article 5, but also of relevant international standards. 12 According to information provided by Tunisian official sources, the National Constituent Assembly may soon adopt a law establishing a separate national preventive mechanism under the OPCAT, which will involve a separate body.