14 CDL-AD(2013)019 54. Moreover, a certain number of members of the Higher Committee should be full-time members, to ensure the Committee’s independence, and avoid actual or perceived conflicts of interest. This would also help enhance the stability of the members’ mandates, and guarantee the ongoing and effective fulfillment of their tasks.21 Upon the end of their tenure, full-time members of the Higher Committee who previously worked in the public service should have the right to resume their previous, or at least a similar post. 55. It is noted that the Law does not foresee cases in which members of the Higher Committee end their term prematurely, e.g. in the cases of resignation, or dismissal. These cases should be set out clearly, and the procedures for dismissing members of the Committee should be transparent and objective.22 Where appropriate, the Law should specify that the application of a ground for dismissal by the competent body (ideally the National Assembly or Parliament, should it be responsible for appointing members of the Committee following a change in legislation) should be supported by the decision of an independent body with appropriate jurisdiction. Generally, both before the dismissing body, and before the independent body, the member being dismissed should have the right to be heard prior to a decision on dismissal being taken. Also, to ensure security of tenure and overall independence of the Higher Committee, dismissal should not be based solely on the discretion of the appointing body.23 56. Generally, members of the Committee should only be dismissed in exceptional cases, namely in cases where they have committed serious crimes, or otherwise severely damaged the reputation of the Committee. In case this responsibility lies with the National Assembly or Parliament, decisions on dismissal shall be taken by a qualified, possibly a two-thirds majority of members of the National Assembly/Parliament. In this context, it is also recommended to include in the Law clear provisions on impermissible conflicts of interest in the exercise of one’s mandate as member of the Higher Committee, and the consequences of such conflict of interest.24 More generally, laying down, at the constitutional level, the basic rules governing not only appointment, but also termination of the term of office of the Higher Committee members would enhance the guarantees of independence and pluralism of both the Higher Committee and its individual members. 4. Working Procedure of the Higher Committee 57. While the Law contains some main parameters of how the Higher Committee operates, the Committee shall, under Article 10, also lay down its own rules of how it “organizes, operates and runs, and its internal regulation”, which are then approved by Presidential Decree. Currently, the Committee has developed Rules on the Organization of the Higher Committee, and an Internal Regulation of the Higher Committee. 58. It is noted that the Law gives the Chairman quite extensive powers, in comparison to the other Committee members: he/she runs and represents the Committee and is “invested with every power” for this purpose (Article 8 of the Law). Furthermore, he/she is appointed directly as Chairman of the Committee by the President, with little indication of a wide, inclusive and transparent selection and appointment process. According to Article 5 of the Law, only the Chairman visits facilities where people are deprived of their liberty (though he/she may designate other members to assist him/her), and under Article 6 of the Law, he/she carries out missions of inquiry and investigation into human rights issues by special order of the President. According to the Internal Regulation of the Higher Committee, he/she has a casting vote in the case of a tied vote. 21 See the General Observations of the ICC Sub-Committee on Accreditation, par. 2.8. See also the Reports and Recommendations from the Session of the ICC Sub-Committee on Accreditation of 19-23 November 2012, Chapter 2, Specific Recommendations, p. 26. 22 See the Reports and Recommendations from the Session of the ICC Sub-Committee on Accreditation of 19-23 November 2012, Chapter 2, Specific Recommendations, p. 14. 23 Ibid., pp. 14 and 18. See also the General Observations of the ICC Sub-Committee on Accreditation, par 2.9 24 See the Reports and Recommendations from the Session of the ICC Sub-Committee on Accreditation of 19-23 November 2012, Chapter 2, Specific Recommendations, pp. 14 and 31.