Doc. 11302 Report And if you look at our situation now, the needs are different from the immediate post-11 September 2001 period. Bringing those 14 HVDs to Guantánamo – the Zubaydahs and the KSMs – was like drawing a line under that programme in the way it had been operating, as a lot of guys weren’t happy going on with it. Sure, there’ll be something else to replace it, but we don’t know what that looks like yet.” 362. Our sources have stated categorically to us that from the perspective of the CIA officials who operated it, the specific aspects of the “high-value detainee” programme on which this report concentrates – including the European “black sites” – belong to a chapter of the post-11 September 2001 story that is essentially closed. 363. At first sight, this analysis appears valid. The 14 HVDs whom our sources agreed to discuss with us (at least on a limited basis) have been transferred to and are all now held at Guantánamo Bay. They have received visits from representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which indicates that their fundamental rights as detainees have at last been regularised, at least as far as this particular aspect is concerned. They are no longer regarded as having high “live” intelligence value for the CIA or the United States Government,313and so they were subject to Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) proceedings in early 2006 to rubber-stamp their status as “unlawful enemy combatants”. Ultimately, these HVDs will be among the first detainees to be charged with specific offences in individual military commissions processes. 364. On the other hand, however, there can be little doubt that the Bush administration is prepared to resort once again to some form of CIA detention and interrogation regime in the future. If President Bush’s claim on 6 September 2006 that “there are now no terrorists in the CIA program” represented the closing of one chapter, then his very next sentence heralded the opening of another: “But as more high-ranking terrorists are captured, the need to obtain intelligence from them will remain critical – and having a CIA programme for questioning terrorists will continue to be crucial to getting life-saving information.”314 365. Indeed, there are clear indications that the HVD programme has been reactivated in recent months. The transfer of Abd Al-Iraqi to Guantánamo Bay in April 2007315bore strikingly similar characteristics to the 14 transfers in September 2006: during his several months in CIA detention prior to his transfer to Cuba, he appears to have been kept incommunicado and subjected to interrogation at an unknown site. 366. Indeed, Al-Iraqi’s handover to the Department of Defense only after his intelligence value to the CIA had been completely exploited would seem to confirm this statement from one of our intelligence sources: “The CIA has gone from having no interest in interrogation to being the agency of preference in this area. We’ll only give them up to the DoD once we’ve got everything we can out of them.” 9.4. Concluding thoughts 367. It is my sincere hope that my report this year will catalyse a renewed appreciation of the legal and moral quagmire into which we have collectively sunk as a result of the American-led “war on terror”. Almost six years on, we seem no closer to pulling ourselves out of this quagmire, partly because of the absence of factual clarity – perpetuated by secrecy, cover-up and dishonesty – about the exact practices in which the United States and its allies have engaged, and partly because of a lack of urgency and political will on both sides of the Atlantic to unite around consensus solutions. 368. By clarifying some of the unspoken truths that have previously held us back in this exercise, I hope I have spurred right-minded Americans and Europeans alike into realising that our common values, in tandem with our common security, depend on our uniting to end the abusive practices inherent in United States policies like the “high-value detainee” programme. 313. See remarks by President Bush, 6 September 2006, supra note 3: “We have largely completed our questioning of the men – and to start the process for bringing them to trial, we must bring them into the open.” One of our sources also conceded that having held these detainees for several years in incommunicado detention, it would be “disingenuous” to say that they are still “live intelligence assets”. 314. See remarks by President Bush, 6 September 2006, supra note 3. Also, for the President’s interpretation of the CIA programme’s status under the revised law, see The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “President Bush Signs Military Commissions Act of 2006”, 17 October 2006, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2006/10/20061017-1.html. The Act, he said, “will allow the Central Intelligence Agency to continue its program for questioning key terrorist leaders and operatives.” 315. See United States Department of Defense, “Defense Department takes custody of al-Qaeda leader,” 27 April 2007, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=32969. 70