Doc. 11302 Report 129. Our sources on both sides of the agreement – in Romania and the United States – emphasised the importance of both trust and national interest as factors underpinning their negotiations. Military assistance – reflected since in the Agreement of December 200590– also significantly influenced the decision to provide facilities and resources, as one American source reflected: “The bilateral arrangements were built on two things: personal relationships and material investment. If your men on the ground have a very good personal relationship with the men in the partner service; that means a lot. And it also means a lot if the Romanians are gonna get their runways improved, new barracks built and new military hardware; that means a lot.” 130. Romania was developed into a site to which more detainees were transferred only as the HVD programme expanded. I understand that the Romanian “black site” was incorporated into the programme in 2003, attained its greatest significance in 2004 and operated until the second half of 2005. The detainees who were held in Romania belonged to a category of HVDs whose intelligence value had been assessed as lower but in respect of whom the agency still considered it worthwhile pursuing further investigations. 131. Asked to provide names of those held in Romania, a senior official in the CIA’s Counter-Terrorism Center, who was directly involved in operating the programme, said: “Look we don’t talk about names, okay. We’ve got a target range that we know less about. We’re acting on their intell[igence] value when we’re less certain.” 132. Our sources told us that some of the targets in this “lower” HVD category had in fact been identified, and sometimes even apprehended, by a foreign intelligence service before they were made available to the CIA. Upon our strict assurance of anonymity, one CIA case officer was willing to describe limited details of a scenario in which a detainee had been “offered to us by our liaisons” and was later transferred to Romania. The detainee was of Afghan nationality. 133. Examples of the profile of those held in Romania were provided to us by two separate American sources. We understand that the profile fits categories such as: – associates and suspected operatives of key Taliban leaders like Mullah Omar; – foreign fighters suspected of having performed roles for the Taliban in Afghanistan, including provision of logistics; – leaders of branches of suspected “support networks” for the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan; or – suspected leaders of terrorist factions in the Middle East. 134. The majority of the detainees brought to Romania were, according to our sources, extracted “out of [the] theatre of conflict”. This phrase is understood as a reference to detainee transfers originating from Afghanistan and, later, Iraq. 135. More specifically, the description of an “out-of-theatre” detention facility presents the mirror image of the kinds of prisons operated “in-theatre”, which are customarily referred to by United States Forces as “Theater Internment Facilities” – one notable example being the “Bagram Theater Internment Facility”.91CIA detainees are known to have been held at facilities such as Bagram both before92and after93having been subjected to rendition, and to secret detention in other countries. 90. For detailed discussion of the agreement between Romania and the United States of December, dated 6 December 2005, refer to Section II.iii.b entitled “Application of the NATO framework in Romania”. 91. For example, official documents refer extensively to the “Bagram Theater Internment Facility” (or “BTIF”) as the name given to the detention facility operated by the United States Department of Defense at the Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan. See, inter alia, Declaration of Colonel Rose M. Miller, Commander of Detention Operations, CJTF-76, in Ruzatullah et al. v. Rumsfeld, before the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 19 November 2006; at paragraph 3. 92. I have information in my possession relating to at least three different detainees who were held at Bagram before being transferred out to secret detention in another country. I have undertaken to treat this information in confidence, so I shall not refer here to names or precise periods in which they were detained. 93. I reported last year on the case of Binyam Mohamed al-Habashi, an Ethiopian citizen and former United Kingdom resident, who was detained at Bagram between May and September 2004 after having been held in CIA custody in Pakistan, Morocco and the “Dark Prison” in Kabul, and subjected to two separate renditions. See the Marty report 2006, supra note 6, at Section 3.9, pp. 42 to 45. 27