Doc. 11302 Report these Romanian sources with the records maintained by Eurocontrol, comprehensive aeronautical “data strings” generated by the international flight planning system, and my complete Marty database. The disagreement between these sources is too fundamental and widespread201to be explained away by simple administrative glitches, or even by in-flight changes of destination by pilots-in-command, which were communicated to one authority but not to another. There presently exists no truthful account of detainee transfer flights into Romania, and the reason for this situation is that the Romanian authorities probably do not want the truth to come out. 230. I found it especially disappointing that the Senate Inquiry Committee chose to interpret its mandate in the rather restrictive terms of defending Romania against what it called “serious accusations against our country, based solely on ‘indications’, ‘opinions’, ‘probabilities’, ‘extrapolations’ [and] ‘logical deductions’”.202In particular, the committee’s conclusions are not framed as coherent findings based on objective fact-finding, but rather as “clear responses to the specific questions raised by Mr Dick Marty”,203referring to both my 2006 report and subsequent correspondence. Accordingly, the categorical nature of the committee’s “general conclusions”,204“Conclusions based on field investigations and site visits”205and “final conclusions”206cannot be sustained. The committee’s work can thus be seen as an exercise in denial and rebuttal, without impartial consideration of the evidence. Particularly in the light of the material and testimony I have received from sources in Romania, the committee does not appear to have engaged in a credible and comprehensive inquiry. 200. The committee to which I refer is the “Senate Committee of Inquiry to investigate the allegations regarding the use of Romanian territory for CIA detention facilities or flights by CIA-chartered aircraft”, established under Article 1 of Decision No. 29 of the Senate, Parliament of Romania, 21 December 2005 (hereinafter referred to as the “Senate Inquiry Committee”). The chairperson of the committee was Senator Norica Nicolai, supported by Vice-Chair George Cristian Maior and Secretary Ilie Petrescu. The committee released its final report on 5 March 2007 (hereinafter “Senate Inquiry Committee Final Report, 5 March 2007” – page numbers refer to the original, Romanian version), a copy of which was submitted as an attachment to Senator Nicolai’s letter to me dated 20 March 2007. My inquiry was also provided with copies of most of the annexes to the final report, including substantial information from airport authorities, handling service providers and the national Air Traffic Services Administration (ROMATSA). I am grateful to Senator Nicolai for facilitating access for my inquiry to important information in Romania. 201. In my letters to the Romanian authorities, I highlighted crucial inconsistencies in flight data relating to the movements of a host of CIA-linked aircraft in Romania, including N313P, N379P and N85VM. The documentation I received back from the Senate Inquiry Committee helps to establish certain landings, but is not authoritative enough to state categorically the exact paths flown by these aircraft, nor the full list of locations in Romania at which they did or did not land. I cannot, for example, content myself with “evidence” that aircraft changed their routes or destinations based on hand-written annotations on flight plans. In several cases I have “data strings” attesting to communications relating to these aircraft that do not correspond with the Senate Inquiry Committee’s version of events. 202. See Senate Inquiry Committee Final Report, 5 March 2007, supra note 200, at Chapter 2, “References to Romania”, page 5. 203. See Senate Inquiry Committee Final Report, 5 March 2007, supra note 200; generally at Chapter 5, “Conclusions reached by the committee based on its documentation and monitoring activities”; and specifically at pp. 10-13. 204. By way of example, the first general conclusion states categorically: “Neither the Romanian Civil Aeronautic Authority nor any other institutions or structures of state with relevant competences in the field investigated by the committee has any knowledge about civilian aircraft operated or chartered by the CIA or by any other company on behalf of the CIA, landing or flying over national territory”; ibid., at p. 10. 205. The committee rules out embarkation or disembarkation of any passengers on the key flights listed in the Marty report of 2006, and states that aircraft associated with the CIA landed only in Bucharest. With regard to MK Airfield, the committee “concludes that there is no facility that could have been used for the purpose of detention, not even on an ad hoc basis. Moreover, none of the flights considered suspicious by the Marty inquiry, by NGOs or by the media has ever landed at this airport”; ibid., at p. 11. Among other evidence, our team obtained records of actual flights into MK Airfield by aircraft associated with the CIA, which directly contradicts the committee’s claim. 206. Final Conclusion No. 5 states as follows: “On the question of whether certain Romanian institutions could have participated knowingly or participated through omission or negligence in unlawful detainee transfer operations in Romanian airspace or at Romanian airports, the committee’s response is negative”; ibid., at p. 14. It should be noted that other final conclusions are not so categorical, however, particularly with regard to whether secret detention facilities could have existed in locations other than the grounds or immediate vicinity of the named airports. 49