Doc. 11302 Report 357. The American study, by the Intelligence Science Board, focuses on practical considerations, essentially considering whether or not interrogation techniques like those used by the CIA are effective in gathering accurate intelligence. In its entirety, the report concludes that many post-11 September 2001 techniques are “outmoded, amateurish and unreliable”;310in its detail, the report offers plausible explanations as to how interrogations have so frequently spiralled into abuse: “Too often, interrogators intensely and aggressively pursue their operational agenda without sufficiently acknowledging that the source, too, has an agenda … Disregarding the source’s interests can lead to unexpected and seemingly inexplicable areas of disagreement and even outright defiance … As this war [on global terrorism] has continued, evidence of the employment of coercive methods by American interrogators has appeared with alarming frequency.”311 358. In my opinion, the very option to make use of coercive techniques based on physical and psychological pain or duress is a poisoned chalice in the hands of a CIA interrogator. Such is the national security imperative to gather tangible, actionable intelligence – not to mention the sense of outrage at the 11 September 2001 attacks for which the HVDs are being blamed, which often mutates into an irrational desire for vengeance – CIA interrogators have resorted and will continue to resort to whatever extremes of coercive treatment they are told is permissible. 359. I support unambiguous, transparent and strictly enforced rules on CIA detainee interrogation. The executive order that President Bush “shall issue” imminently312should be published in full and should expressly outlaw not only the abhorrent practice of “water-boarding”, but also techniques like slapping, stress positions, sleep deprivation and extremes of temperature. I note that even the Army Field Manual of September 2006 leaves open the possibility that such techniques are not prohibited, so that manual does not strike me as an appropriately robust set of minimum standards. When the long-awaited rules for the CIA are finally issued, they must set higher, clearer thresholds that maintain the integrity of these important interrogations. 9.3. Perceptions of the HVD programme and its likely reactivation 360. At the time of his 6 September 2006 speech, President Bush lauded the HVD programme as a policy that “has been, and remains, one of the most vital tools in our war against the terrorists”. In the experience of our team during this inquiry, the President’s view is largely shared among those officers who had knowledge of the programme. With only very few exceptions, the majority of our sources in the CIA and the wider intelligence community have described the HVD programme as a success, or in one case “about as good as it could have turned out”. 361. The following is an excerpt from our interview with a senior United States intelligence source: “I think you have to understand that the programme we ran through 2005, into 2006 to handle the HVDs was both needs-oriented and results-oriented. We needed to show that we could capture those responsible for 11 September 2001, break down key al-Qaeda cells at their source, and keep the threat of terror attacks as far away from the American people as possible. We needed to work with our most trusted allies to avoid leaks that would endanger national security – ours or theirs. The results speak for themselves. 310. For a review of the full report and several background interviews with its authors, see Scott Shane and Mark Mazzetti, “Interrogation Methods are Criticised”, in The New York Times, 30 May 2007, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/ 2007/05/30/washington/30interrogate.html? bl=&_r=1&ei=5087%0A&en=dc81cce01b99827c&ex=1180756800&adxnnl=1&oref=slogin&adxnnlx=1180692698m6KgJwvypPYbDzvaqwOvCA 311. See Steve Kleinman, “Barriers to Success: Critical Challenges in Developing a New Educing Information Paradigm”, excerpts taken from pp. 254, 255 and 265, in Intelligence Science Board, “Educing Information”, supra note 308, at pp. 235-266. 312. According to the Military Commissions Act 2006, at paragraphs 6.a.3.A and B, the president “shall issue” an executive order containing authoritative interpretations of the “meaning and application of the Geneva Conventions” that would then apply to interrogations carried out by the CIA. Recent news reports have stated that a lengthy deliberative process involving lawyers in the State Department, the White House, Directorate of National Intelligence and the Department of Defense would most likely lead to this executive order being published before the summer of 2007; see, for example, Mark Mazzetti, “CIA Awaits Rules on Terrorism Interrogations”, in The New York Times, 25 March 2007, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/25/washington/25interrogate.html?ex= 1332475200&en=c7c0814347030512&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss. 69