Doc. 11302 Report 82. It is now clear to me that as they went to their international allies with their proposals, the United States insisted – non-officially but explicitly – upon a clear set of unilateral prerogatives: only American officials would choose exactly who they wanted to work with; only American policies would define exactly the terms of the relationship; and only American interpretations of the applicable law (including whether or not it applied) would be held to bind its actions overseas. 83. Based upon my investigations, confirmed by multiple sources in the governmental and intelligence sectors of several countries, I consider that I can assert that the means to cater to the CIA’s key operational needs on a multilateral level were developed under the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). 3.1.2. Invocation of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty 84. It should be recalled that the United States turned to the international community at an unprecedented moment in history. As a prominent United States Congressman remarked recently, “in the wake of the horrific attack on the United States on 11 September [2001], we were moved by the extraordinary support and the outpouring of sympathy from across the globe”.34These sentiments manifested themselves in a unique and almost universally shared conviction that the United States should be granted strong support for its international counter-terrorist efforts, including for the use of military force. 85. This conviction was most pronounced within the NATO Alliance. On 12 September 2001, NATO thereby invoked the principle of collective defence according to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty,35and this for the first time in its fifty-two-year existence. Initially, the invocation was considered provisional because it began with a conditional clause: “If it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.”36 86. During the weeks that followed, several of the most senior officials in the Bush administration delivered “a series of classified briefings for the NATO members presenting evidence that al-Qaeda had planned and executed the attacks”37and outlining their intended response. There is evidence in the following excerpt from an account by a then NATO Assistant Secretary-General that some of the United States’ “unilateral prerogatives” described by our sources were articulated in quite explicit terms during these briefings: “I was present in the [North Atlantic] Council two weeks after NATO invoked Article 5 when then United States Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz set out his post-11 September 2001 doctrine to the effect that the mission determines the coalition. This was, in my opinion, a fundamental misjudgment about the nature of the alliance that devalued the importance of strategic solidarity.”38 34. Representative William Delahunt (D-Ma), Chairman of the International Organisations, Human Rights and Oversight Sub-Committee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, opening remarks on the subject “Extraordinary Rendition in United States Counterterrorism Policy: The Impact on Transatlantic Relations”, 17 April 2007. Mr Delahunt also said: “I shall never forget the headline from the French newspaper Le Monde that proclaimed, ‘Today, we are all Americans’. Sadly, that support has eroded dramatically… World opinion has turned against the United States in recent years [and]… this reality, this trend of opinion against the United States has profound negative consequences for our national interests.” 35. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides as follows: “The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.” 36. See NATO press release (2001) 124, “Statement by the North Atlantic Council”, 12 September 2001. 37. See Nora Bensahel, “Counterterror Coalitions: Co-operation with Europe, NATO and the European Union”, The Rand Corporation, United States, 2003 (hereinafter “Bensahel, ‘Counterterror Coalitions’”); at pp. 6-7. According to Bensahel, the American policy makers who briefed NATO included Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of Defence, Paul Wolfowitz and State Department Co-ordinator for Counter-terrorism, Frank Taylor. 38. See Edgar Buckley, former NATO Assistant Secretary-General for Defence Planning and Operations (from 1999 to 2003), “Invoking Article 5���, in NATO Review, Summer 2006, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue2/ english/art2.html (hereinafter “Buckley, “Invoking Article 5”). 18