Doc. 11302 Report 3.1.4. The wider NATO system and the “war on terror” 106. Aside from the specific authorisations detailed above, the wider NATO system comprises further important elements that have been developed as part of the post-11 September 2001 framework for CIA clandestine operations – including the high-value detainee programme. I intend to examine these elements in the following section as they have been applied to specific countries with which the United States has agreed bilateral arrangements in the course of the “war on terror”. For now it suffices to acknowledge the general NATO multilateral treaties or policies on which those arrangements are based. 107. First is the system of NATO SOFAs (Status of Forces Agreements), which define the legal status of one state’s armed forces on the territory of another state. The general rules of such relationships are set out in the multilateral SOFA for all NATO members,69the provisions of which also apply to “aspirant” states through their participation in the “Partnership for Peace”.70 108. A state does not abandon its sovereignty when it signs a SOFA; on the contrary, SOFAs usually reflect different sets of legal rights and responsibilities that accrue for both the sending state and the host state.71The majority of SOFAs are agreed on the bilateral level and are sometimes complemented by further, more finite defence agreements that cover foreign forces stationed at particular bases or facilities. Several Council of Europe member states have acknowledged the applicability of SOFA-type agreements to their relationships with the United States in the context of the “war on terror”.72 109. An additional relevant element of the wider NATO system is its secrecy and security-of-information regime. The NATO Security Policy73and its supporting Directive on the Security of Information74are among the most formidable barriers to disclosure of information that one might ever come across. It is easy to understand why an institution or state agency wishing to carry out clandestine operations would opt to bring them under the protection of the NATO model. 69. See NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) of 19 June 1951, “Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces”, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/ basictxt/b510619a.htm. 70. See NATO Partnership for Peace SOFA (PfP-SOFA) of 1995, “Agreement among the State Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the other States participating in the Partnership for Peace Regarding the Status of their Forces,” available at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/ b950619a.htm. It is important to note that, since it came into force in 1995, this PfP-SOFA has entitled signatories to the Partnership for Peace (PfP) that are not yet members of NATO to nevertheless sign so-called “SOFA Supplementals” with NATO member states. signatories to the PfP are available at http://www.nato.int/pfp/sig-date.htm. 71. See the Venice Commission Opinion, 17 March 2006, supra note 52, at paragraphs 106-107. For a general overview, see also the EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, “The Human Rights Responsibilities of the EU member states in the context of the CIA activities in Europe”, 25 May 2006, available at http://ec.europa.eu/ justice_home/cfr_cdf/doc/avis/2006_3_en.pdf. 72. In this regard, it should be noted that nine different Council of Europe member states made reference to NATO, SOFAs or defence agreements with the United States in their replies to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe in the context of his inquiry under Article 52 ECHR. For copies of all member states’ replies and the SG’s report on his findings, SG/Inf(2006)5, see the Special File at http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/Files/Events/2006-cia/. In particular, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and Romania made reference to Article 7 of the NATO SOFA as a provision that determines their potential jurisdiction over foreign forces operating on their territories. Article 7 of the multilateral NATO SOFA provides: “The authorities of the receiving state shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over members of a force or civilian component and their dependents with respect to offences, including offences related to the security of that state, punishable by its law but not by the law of the sending state.” 73. NATO’s comprehensive Security Policy was modified and updated through a Fundamental Review by the NATO Security Committee (NSC), which concluded in early 2002. The policy is now contained in two documents approved by the North Atlantic Council: C-M(2002)49, “Security within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)”; and C-M(2002)50, “Protection Measures for NATO Civil and Military Bodies, deployed NATO Forces and Installations (Assets) against Terrorist Threats”. The first of these documents, C-M(2002)49, which entered into force on 17 June 2002, contains the applicable rules on classification, handling and protection of sensitive information, as well as rules on establishment of and access to NATO Security Areas, and rules relating to NATO personnel. C-M(2002)49 was released on 1 August 2006 by the Hungarian National Security Superintendence in response to a freedom of information request by the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (HCLU); copy on file with the rapporteur. C-M(2002)49 is hereinafter referred to as “NATO, Security within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 17 June 2002”. 74. NATO Security Committee, “Directive on the Security of Information”, Document AC/35-D/2002, Second Revision, issued 4 February 2005. AC/35-D/2002-REV2 was released in October 2006 by the Hungarian National Security Superintendence in response to a freedom of information request by the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (HCLU); copy on file with the Rapporteur. AC/35-D/2002-REV2 is hereinafter referred to as “NATO Security Committee, Directive on the Security of Information, 4 February 2005”. 23