Doc. 11302 Report to say that his “guys were familiar with the area” was its inclusion of the landing point at which scores of civil and military flights carrying American service personnel have landed throughout the “war on terror”: Mihail Kogalniceanu Airfield. 225. In the light of all that I have said above about MK Airfield, I only wish to draw attention to one further factor that has made it a venue so conducive to “partnership” with the CIA: its “dual” military-civilian character. 196Military personnel worked routinely with civilian air traffic controllers in processing both civil and military flights at the airfield – each according to the applicable aviation rules. The system used at MK Airfield bears great similarities, albeit on a much smaller scale, to the system used at Kabul Airport (OAKB),197which became such a hub in the context of coalition military activities in Afghanistan and simultaneously a destination or departure point for multiple known renditions of CIA detainees on board civilian aircraft since the start of the “war on terror”. 226. During the period of interest to my inquiry – from 2002 until 2005 – the civilian section of the MK Airfield had a director general with a formidable “dual” civil-military character of his own. Rtd Colonel Mircea Dionisie was a former controlling commander of the military air force base at MK Airfield in the Communist pre-1989 era. He returned to the airfield in 2002 and became the director general of the civilian airport, now known as Aeroportul International Mihail Kogalniceanu Constanta (AIMKC).198 Rtd Colonel Dionisie stayed in this position until 12 July 2005 and therefore oversaw the bulk of the flights into and out of the MK Airfield, the exact movements of which – as well as their connections to CIA detainee transfers – my inquiry has attempted to trace. 5.3.2. Transfer of detainees into Romania: the cover-up persists 227. Our efforts to obtain accurate actual flight records pertaining to the movements of aircraft associated with the CIA in Romania were characterised by obfuscation, inconsistency and genuine confusion. I must begin this assessment, however, by commending my colleagues and their assistant in the Romanian delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly and, in particular, its chairperson Gyorgy Frunda, for demonstrating exceptional good faith and professionalism, and for extending the very best of co-operation and assistance to my inquiry. It is unfortunate that the Romanian authorities more generally did not match the levels of thoroughness and transparency shown by this delegation. 228. Specifically I hold three principal concerns with the approach of the Romanian authorities towards the repeated allegations of secret detentions in Romania, and towards my inquiry in particular. In summary, my concerns are: far-reaching and unexplained inconsistencies in Romanian flight and airport data; the responsive and defensive posturing of the national parliamentary inquiry, which stopped short of genuine inquisitiveness; and the insistence of Romania on a position of sweeping, categorical denial of all the allegations, in the process overlooking extensive evidence to the contrary from valuable and credible sources. 229. First I was confounded by the clear inconsistencies in the flight data provided to my inquiry from multiple different Romanian sources. In my analysis I have considered data submitted directly from the Romanian Civil Aeronautical Authority (RCAA),199data provided by the Romanian Senate Committee,200and data gathered independently by our team in the course of its investigations. I have compared the data from 196. The “dual use” character of MK Airfield dates back to 1961, when the Romanian Ministry of National Defence handed over the following elements of the airfield to the civilian authorities of Constanta International Airport: the runway/landing strip; the “parking aprons” for both light and heavy aircraft; the terminal buildings, including the Air Traffic Control Tower; and the main entrance/exit points from the adjacent highway. This restructuring created two “sections” on the MK Airfield: a civilian section and a military section. According to our discussions with Romanian military personnel stationed at the MK Airfield, the civilian and military sections keep one another informed only “for operational reasons [for example use of the runway] and on a need-to-know basis”. These personnel told us that “everybody plays by the rules, and that is one of the main reasons for the military side’s close co-operation with the civilian side”. 197. It is a little known fact that Romanian personnel managed and operated Kabul Airport as one of their tasks in the context of their NATO deployment, 2004 to 2006. Our team spoke with a senior military officer who was seconded directly from MK Airfield to serve for several months at OAKB. 198. Denoted by the ICAO code “LRCK”. Aeroportul International Mihail Kogalniceanu Constanta (AIMKC) is the new name of the airport. It was previously called simply Aeroportul International Constanta (AIC), but – according to its current Director General – took on the additional MK in its name in order to benefit from the “free publicity” generated by the media scandal over CIA flights allegedly having landed at MK Airfield. Mihail Kogalniceanu was the first President of Romania and – in addition to the MK Airfield – also gave his name to a town about 50 kilometres north of Constanta. Romanians tell me it was the first town in the country to have an entirely literate population. 199. See, for example, “Information from the records of the Romanian Civil Aeronautic Authority (RCAA) and the Romanian Ministry of National Defence”, contained as appendices to the letters sent to me by Gyorgy Frunda, chairperson of the Romanian delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly, dated 24 February 2006 and 7 April 2006. 48