Doc. 11302 Report 291. Disagreement between the representatives of the German Government and opposition parties in the Bundestag Committee of Inquiry continues to exist as to the extent to which different German authorities were involved or at least informed of Mr El-Masri’s case, and when. The testimonies of a Telecom employee and a junior member of the German intelligence services – claiming that Macedonian officials informed the German Embassy in Skopje of Mr El-Masri’s detention before he was transported to Afghanistan – were not considered by the majority of the committee to be sufficiently conclusive to be able to hold the political leadership accountable.241 292. More generally, opposition members on the committee have voiced their frustration that the executive is limiting the possibility for the committee elucidate the truth by invoking official secrecy, refusing access to key files or testimony on this ground. Information relating to the “core field of executive to privilege” and information which must be kept secret in the higher interests of the state (Staatswohl) is not available to the UA even when meeting in camera. It is the executive itself which decides what information falls into this category, apparently without any parliamentary control; the current trend is to extend this concept of knowledge restricted to the executive, a move which has come in for much criticism from the members of the UA. The latter have recently decided to refer this matter to the Federal Constitutional Court.242Even classified information which does not fall into this category has to be dealt with in camera by the committee, which means that it cannot be publicised by the members of the UA; this too has been criticised by some members of the Bundestag.243 293. Prosecutor Hofmann, who also testified before the UA, had transmitted the entire case file to the committee, including elements that were classified as secret. But during his public testimony, he was obliged to withhold his answers to certain questions relating to classified documents. His offer to discuss the classified material in a closed session was not taken up, although this procedure had been followed for other witnesses. 294. As a result of the UA’s work, the German Government and government departments have been made more aware of human rights aspects and the rule of law.244The UA recently agreed to avail itself, for the first time, of the possibility provided for in the law governing committees of inquiry to appoint a “special investigator” with effect from the summer 2007 parliamentary recess, tasked on behalf of the UA with looking into the CIA rendition flights.245 295. Meanwhile Mr El-Masri’s civil lawsuit in the United States against the CIA is entering its final phase: an appeal to the United States Supreme Court, after the rejection of his case on grounds of state secrecy in the first instance, upheld by the court of appeal,246was announced by Mr Gnjidic on 30 May 2007. 296. Against this background, Mr El-Masri himself is still suffering severely from the psychological consequences of the ordeal he has gone through. He has been repeatedly victimised by personal attacks in the local media and has been unable to find employment in the last three years. In January 2007, he lashed out physically at a vocational training officer, who he felt had treated him unfairly. On 17 May 2007, he was arrested in Neu-Ulm as a suspect in a case of arson and placed in a psychiatric hospital.247This dramatic development in Mr El-Masri’s personal situation merely confirms the repeated claims by his lawyer, 241. The political leadership could only be held responsible for “organisational error” for failing to report back with the relevant information in good time. 242. Tagesthemen.de of 21 May 2007, citing Mr Max Stadler. 243. Mr Stadler has alluded to “organised leaks” by members of government parties designed or at least objectively likely to mislead the public on the substance of the in-camera discussions – one case in point was the private hearing of officers who had interrogated Mr Kurnaz in Guantánamo Bay and the matter of the American “offer”, apparently refused by the German authorities, to allow Mr Kurnaz to be repatriated. 244. Mr Stadler gave as an example an apparently similar case of a long-term German resident arrested in Pakistan who was able to return to Germany without the government raising the objections it did in the case of Mr Kurnaz; a second example is the approach adopted by the Bundestag’s Legal Affairs Committee to a bill to facilitate information exchange between executive services in the fight against terrorism. The committee insisted on including measures to prevent this being misused for rendition purposes. 245. Mr Stadler insisted that this “special investigator” would not be replacing the committee but would be preparing the way by carrying out preliminary investigations which would facilitate the UA’s subsequent work. 246. No. 06-1667 of 2 March 2007 (4th circuit). 247. He is suspected of having set fire to a wholesale market in Neu-Ulm (see Spiegel online, 17 May 2007). 57