JALLOH v. GERMANY JUDGMENT 13 coercion. ... It would be a stultification of the responsibility which the course of constitutional history has cast upon this Court to hold that in order to convict a man the police cannot extract by force what is in his mind but can extract what is in his stomach. To attempt in this case to distinguish what lawyers call ‘real evidence’ from verbal evidence is to ignore the reasons for excluding coerced confessions. Use of involuntary verbal confessions in State criminal trials is constitutionally obnoxious not only because of their unreliability. They are inadmissible under the Due Process Clause even though statements contained in them may be independently established as true. Coerced confessions offend the community’s sense of fair play and decency. So here, to sanction the brutal conduct which naturally enough was condemned by the court whose judgment is before us, would be to afford brutality the cloak of law. Nothing would be more calculated to discredit law and thereby to brutalize the temper of a society.” 51. In State of Ohio v. Dario Williams (2004 WL 1902368 (Ohio App. 8 Dist.)), the Ohio Court of Appeals held on 26 August 2004 that the pumping of the defendant’s stomach in the face of his objections was not an unreasonable search and seizure. The defendant was observed engaging in a hand-to-hand transaction typical of drug dealing. When police officers ordered the defendant to their vehicle, he put something in his mouth and ran off. In the opinion of the court, flushing out the defendant’s stomach by gastric lavage by a physician in a hospital setting was not an unreasonable measure, even though the defendant violently objected to the procedure and had to be sedated. Swallowing the cocaine, which had been seen in the defendant’s mouth, put his life in jeopardy and he was destroying evidence. 52. Mr Justice T.E. McMonagle, delivering the Court of Appeals’ opinion, found: “19. Williams directs us to Rochin v. California, 342 US 165 (1952), ... one of the prominent cases on intrusive searches. ... 21. Rochin is not dispositive, however. After Rochin, the United States Supreme Court decided Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757 (1966), 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908, in which a police officer ordered an individual suspected of driving while intoxicated to submit to a blood test at the hospital where he was being treated for injuries sustained in an automobile collision. The Supreme Court noted that ‘the Fourth Amendment’s proper function is to constrain, not against all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner’. ... Finding no Fourth Amendment violation, the Court set forth several criteria to be considered in determining the reasonableness of an intrusive search: 1) the government must have a clear indication that incriminating evidence will be found; 2) the police officers must have a warrant, or, there must be exigent circumstances, such as the imminent destruction of evidence, to excuse the warrant requirement; and 3) the method used to extract the evidence must be reasonable and must be performed in a reasonable manner. ...