JALLOH v. GERMANY JUDGMENT – CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE BRATZA 37 change according to the gravity of the suspected offence or the urgency of the need to obtain evidence of the offence. For the same reason, I do not consider that the question whether particular treatment violates Article 3 should depend on whether or not the aim sought by the use of the treatment (in this case, the evidence of drug dealing) could be obtained by other methods which did not involve such treatment. The relevance of the fact that, according to the material before the Court, few if any other member States appear to permit the forcible administration of emetics to suspected drug offenders, under any circumstances and whatever the gravity of the suspected offence, seems to me to lie in the confirmation it provides of what is to be regarded as acceptable treatment of suspects. In my view, for the other reasons set out in the judgment with which I fully concur, the treatment to which the applicant was subjected did reach the threshold of Article 3 and was in violation of that Article. Article 6 The Court’s finding of a violation of Article 6 of the Convention is based on the principal ground that the use in evidence of drugs obtained by the forcible administration of emetics in violation of Article 3 of the Convention rendered his trial as a whole unfair. The Court, however, goes on in its judgment to address the applicant’s additional argument that the manner in which the evidence was obtained and the use made of it at his trial undermined his right not to incriminate himself, before concluding that it would have been prepared to find a violation of Article 6 on this further basis. I can, in general, agree with the Court’s principal ground, and its reasoning, for finding a violation of Article 6 and would echo the words of Mr Justice Frankfurter, in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Rochin v. California, that “the proceedings by which this conviction was obtained do more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combating a crime too energetically”. While, as the Court has frequently observed, the Convention does not lay down any rules on evidence as such, the admissibility of evidence being primarily a matter for regulation by national law, the use of evidence obtained by treatment violating the fundamental values enshrined in Article 3 appears to me to offend against the whole concept of a fair trial, even if the admission of such evidence is not – as it was in the present case – decisive in securing a conviction. As in the case of the use of coerced confessions, it is the offensiveness to civilised values of fairness and the detrimental effect on the integrity of the judicial process, as much as the unreliability of any evidence which may be obtained, which lies at the heart of the objection to its use.