7. In his comments, dated 29 March 1989, counsel contends that although Section 3 of the Poor Prisoners' Defence Act provides legal aid for purposes of a petition for special leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, an appeal to that body constitutes a remedy of limited scope. He adds that the State party has failed to show how this remedy could have been or could be effective in the circumstances of the case and concludes that the requirements of article 5, paragraph 2 (b) have been met. 8. In a further submission, dated 20 June 1989, the State party submits that a petition for special leave to appeal to the Privy Council is a genuine remedy: thus, in the author's case, such a petition would be considered in a judicial hearing and adjudicated on grounds that are both judicial and reasonable. If the Privy Council were to refuse the petition as without merit, the author could not claim that he had no remedy; he would merely have been unsuccessful in the pursuit. The State party therefore maintains that the communication is inadmissible on the ground of failure to exhaust domestic remedies. 9. In further comments dated 16 February 1990, counsel affirms that while Section 3 of the Poor Prisoners' Defence Act may provide legal aid for purposes of a petition for special leave to appeal, such a petition would inevitably fail in the author's case. He points out that although the long delays in the judicial proceedings in the case should be deemed to constitute a denial of justice, the Judicial Committee has held, in the case of Riley and others v. The Queen (1981) that whatever the reasons for delays in the execution of a sentence lawfully imposed, the delay could afford no ground for holding the execution to be in contravention of Section 17 of the Jamaican Constitution. Counsel concludes that a petition for special leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council would not be a remedy "available" to the author within the meaning of article 5, paragraph 2 (b). 10.1 Before considering any claims presented in a communication, the Human Rights Committee must, in accordance with rule 87 of its rules of procedure, decide whether or not it is admissible under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant. 10.2 The Committee has ascertained, as it is required to do under article 5, paragraph 2 (a), of the Optional Protocol, that the matter is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. 10.3 With respect to the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies, the Committee notes the State party's contention that the author may still petition the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council for special leave to appeal. It notes that the author was sentenced to death on 5 October 1977. Although the application of domestic remedies over a period of thirteen years could be construed as being "unreasonably prolonged" within the meaning of article 5, paragraph 2 (b), it is a well established principle that any appellant must display reasonable diligence in the pursuit of available remedies. In the instant case, it was incumbent upon the author or his representative to pursue the avenue of a petition for special leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee after the Jamaican Court of Appeal had, in April 1978, produced its written judgement in the case. The author and his counsel have not shown, although they were invited to do so, the existence of circumstances which would have absolved them from petitioning the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in due course. In the circumstances, the Committee concludes that the delays in the judicial proceedings can be attributed mainly to the author, and that the requirements of article 5, paragraph 2 (b), of the Optional Protocol have not been met. 11. The Human Rights Committee therefore decides: (a) That the communication is inadmissible under article 5, paragraph 2 (b), of the Option Protocol; (b) That this decision shall be transmitted to the State party, to the author and to his counsel. 16