4.4 With respect to an alleged violation of article 9 (1) of the Covenant, the State party indicates that Mr. R's detention from 5 January 1982 to 11 March 1982 was based on the certificate jointly issued by the Canadian Solicitor General and by the Minister of Employment and Immigration pursuant to Section 39 of the Immigration Act, stating that "Based on security and criminal intelligence reports received and considered by us, which cannot be revealed in order to protect information sources, [the author] is a person described in paragraph 19 (1) (f) of the Immigration Act, 1976, his presence in Canada being detrimental to the national interest". Thus, the State party submits that the lawful detention of an alien against whom there exists an exclusion order cannot be deemed to constitute arbitrary detention. Furthermore, the State party explains that in the case of a person seeking asylum, a reasonable amount of time must be allotted to the authorities to collect information, investigate, and carefully determine the sensitive question whether an individual poses a danger to national security. In this context the State party refers to article 5 (1) (f) of the European Convention on Human Rights, which specifically provides that No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: . . . (f) The lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorized entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. While article 9 (1) of the Covenant is not as specific as the parallel provision in the European Convention, the State party submits that the scope of article 9 (1) does not cover detention for the purposes of immigration control and that this aspect of the communication should be declared inadmissible ratione materiae. 4.5 Although the author does not invoke article 13 of the Covenant, the State party addresses the issue of the expulsion of aliens as provided for in the Covenant and refers to the Committee's decision in case No. 58/1979 Anna Maroufidou v. Sweden, where the Committee held that her deportation from Sweden did not constitute a violation of the Covenant because she had been expelled in accordance with the procedure laid down by the State's domestic law and that there had been no evidence of bad faith or abuse of power. In this context the Government of Canada asserts that the deportation proceedings against Mr. R. are in compliance with the requirements of article 13 of the Covenant. 4.6 With respect to an alleged violation of article 14 (1) of the Covenant, the State party submits that a procedure for the expulsion of an alien which is specifically envisioned under article 13 of the Covenant cannot be said to be in violation of article 14. More particularly, the State party observes that the protections contained in article 14 of the Covenant apply to the determination of any "criminal charge" or of any "rights and obligations in a suit at law". It submits that deportation proceedings do not fall into either of these categories; rather, they fall into the domain of public law. Since asylum or deportation proceedings are not covered by the terms of article 14, this aspect of the communication should be declared inadmissible ratione materiae. 4.7 With respect to an alleged violation of articles 18 and 19 of the Covenant, the State party objects that the author has not submitted evidence to substantiate a prima facie case of any violation of his rights to freedom of thought, opinion and expression. Finally, with respect to an alleged violation of articles 2 and 26 of the Covenant, the State party submits that the author has submitted insufficient evidence to disclose a prima facie violation of these provisions, that his allegations are manifestly ill-founded, and that these aspects of the communication should be declared inadmissible as an abuse of the right of submission pursuant to article 3 of the Optional Protocol. 5.1 Commenting on the State party's submission under rule 91, the author, on 20 April 1988, reiterates that the order for his expulsion represents an objective danger to his life and refers to the jurisprudence of the European Commission of Human Rights in this respect. He further argues that his communication does not invoke a right of asylum, and that a distinction must be made between the request for a right of asylum, and asylum resulting from the establishment of certain mechanisms to remedy violations of the Covenant alleged by individuals. It was not the deportation order which he denounced but the breach of specific rights guaranteed by the Covenant. 54